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Incentives and the core of an exchange economy: a survey

  • FORGES, Françoise
  • MINELLI, Enrico
  • VOHRA, Rajiv

This paper provides a general overview of the literature on the core of an exchange economy with asymetric information. Incentive compatibility is emphasized in studying core concepts at the ex ante and the interim stage.The analysis includes issues of non emptiness of the core as wellas core convergence to price equilibrium allocations.

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Paper provided by Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE) in its series CORE Discussion Papers with number 2001043.

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Date of creation: 00 Sep 2001
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Handle: RePEc:cor:louvco:2001043
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