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Cooperative Games With Incomplete Information: Some Open Problems

Author

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  • FRANÇOISE FORGES

    (CEREMADE and LEDa, Université Paris-Dauphine, Place du Maréchal de Lattre de Tassigny, 75775 Paris cedex 16, France;
    Institut Universitaire de France, France)

  • ROBERTO SERRANO

    (Department of Economics, Brown University, Providence, RI 02912, USA)

Abstract

This is a brief survey describing some of the recent progress and open problems in the area of cooperative games with incomplete information. We discuss exchange economies, cooperative Bayesian games with orthogonal coalitions, and issues of cooperation in noncooperative Bayesian games.

Suggested Citation

  • Françoise Forges & Roberto Serrano, 2013. "Cooperative Games With Incomplete Information: Some Open Problems," International Game Theory Review (IGTR), World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., vol. 15(02), pages 1-17.
    • Handle: RePEc:wsi:igtrxx:v:15:y:2013:i:02:n:s0219198913400094
    DOI: 10.1142/S0219198913400094
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    22. Yusuke Kamishiro & Roberto Serrano, 2011. "Equilibrium Blocking in Large Quasilinear Economies," Mathematics of Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 36(3), pages 552-567, August.
    23. Francoise Forges & Jean-Francois Mertens & Rajiv Vohra, 2002. "The Ex Ante Incentive Compatible Core in the Absence of Wealth Effects," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 70(5), pages 1865-1892, September.
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Salamanca, Andrés, 2020. "On the values of Bayesian cooperative games with sidepayments," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 108(C), pages 38-49.
    2. V. K. Oikonomou & J. Jost, 2020. "Periodic Strategies II: Generalizations and Extensions," Papers 2005.12832, arXiv.org.
    3. Jonathan Newton, 2019. "Agency Equilibrium," Games, MDPI, vol. 10(1), pages 1-15, March.
    4. Mikhail Safronov, 2016. "A Coasian Approach to Efficient Mechanism Design," Cambridge Working Papers in Economics 1619, Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge.
    5. Ray, Debraj & Vohra, Rajiv, 2015. "Coalition Formation," Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications,, Elsevier.
    6. Andrés Salamanca, 2020. "A generalization of the Harsanyi NTU value to games with incomplete information," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 49(1), pages 195-225, March.
    7. Akira Okada, 2015. "Cooperation and Institution in Games," The Japanese Economic Review, Japanese Economic Association, vol. 66(1), pages 1-32, March.
    8. Geoffroy de Clippel & Jack Fanning & Kareen Rozen, 2022. "Bargaining over Contingent Contracts under Incomplete Information," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 112(5), pages 1522-1554, May.
    9. Roberto Serrano, 2021. "Sixty-seven years of the Nash program: time for retirement?," SERIEs: Journal of the Spanish Economic Association, Springer;Spanish Economic Association, vol. 12(1), pages 35-48, March.
    10. Kevin A. Bryan & Michael D. Ryall & Burkhard C. Schipper, 2022. "Value Capture in the Face of Known and Unknown Unknowns," Strategy Science, INFORMS, vol. 7(3), pages 157-189, September.
    11. Kamishiro, Yusuke & Vohra, Rajiv & Serrano, Roberto, 2023. "Signaling, screening, and core stability," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 213(C).
    12. Yusuke Kamishiro & Roberto Serrano & Myrna Wooders, 2021. "Monopolists of scarce information and small group effectiveness in large quasilinear economies," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 50(4), pages 801-827, December.
    13. Routledge, R.R., 2014. "Deviations, uncertainty and the core," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 88(C), pages 286-297.
    14. Hellman, Ziv & Peretz, Ron, 2018. "Values for cooperative games over graphs and games with inadmissible coalitions," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 108(C), pages 22-36.
    15. Ziv Hellman & Ron Peretz, 2015. "Values for Cooperative Games over Graphs and Games With Inadmissible Coalitions," Working Papers 2015-04, Bar-Ilan University, Department of Economics.
    16. Yusuke Kamishiro & Roberto Serrano, 2020. "Small Informational Size and Interim Cores of Large Quasilinear Economies," International Game Theory Review (IGTR), World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., vol. 22(01), pages 1-12, March.
    17. Yusuke Kamishiro, 2015. "On the core of a cost allocation problem under asymmetric information," Operations Research and Decisions, Wroclaw University of Science and Technology, Faculty of Management, vol. 25(1), pages 17-32.
    18. Xuan Vinh Doan & Tri-Dung Nguyen, 2019. "Technical Note—Robust Newsvendor Games with Ambiguity in Demand Distributions," Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 68(4), pages 1047-1062, July.
    19. Toshiji Miyakawa, 2017. "The farsighted core in a political game with asymmetric information," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 49(1), pages 205-229, June.
    20. Yusuke Kamishiro & Roberto Serrano & Myrna Wooders, 2015. "Information and Small Group Effectiveness in Large Quasilinear Economies," Working Papers 2015-11, Brown University, Department of Economics.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Strategic externalities; informational externalities; exchange economies; cooperative games with orthogonal coalitions; noncooperative Bayesian games; C71; C72; D51; D82;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • B4 - Schools of Economic Thought and Methodology - - Economic Methodology
    • C0 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - General
    • C6 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Mathematical Methods; Programming Models; Mathematical and Simulation Modeling
    • C7 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory
    • D5 - Microeconomics - - General Equilibrium and Disequilibrium
    • D7 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making
    • M2 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Business Economics

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