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Values for cooperative games with incomplete information: An eloquent example

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  • de Clippel, Geoffroy

Abstract

Myerson's (1984) extension of the lambda-transfer value to cooperative games with incomplete information focus among other things on the strength of the incentive constraints at the solution for determining the power of coalitions. We construct an intuitive three-player game where the player whose only contribution is to partly release the two other players from the incentive constraints they face when they cooperate, receives a zero payoff, according to Myerson's solution. On the contrary, the random order arrival procedure attributes a strictly positive payoff to him. Our example is thus an analog of the banker game of Owen (1972) that was designed for evaluating the lambda-transfer value under complete information. Asymmetric information now takes up the role that was formerly attributed to the lack of transferability of utilities.
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  • de Clippel, Geoffroy, 2005. "Values for cooperative games with incomplete information: An eloquent example," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 53(1), pages 73-82, October.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:53:y:2005:i:1:p:73-82
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Myerson, Roger B, 1983. "Mechanism Design by an Informed Principal," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 51(6), pages 1767-1797, November.
    2. Roger B. Myerson, 1982. "Two-Person Bargaining Problems with Incomplete Infonnation," Discussion Papers 527, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
    3. Forges, Francoise & Minelli, Enrico & Vohra, Rajiv, 2002. "Incentives and the core of an exchange economy: a survey," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 38(1-2), pages 1-41, September.
    4. Myerson, Roger B, 1979. "Incentive Compatibility and the Bargaining Problem," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 47(1), pages 61-73, January.
    5. Maschler, M & Owen, G, 1989. "The Consistent Shapley Value for Hyperplane Games," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, pages 389-407.
    6. Aumann, Robert J, 1985. "An Axiomatization of the Non-transferable Utility Value," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 53(3), pages 599-612, May.
    7. Manuel García-Goñi & Pere Ibern & José Inoriza, 2009. "Hybrid risk adjustment for pharmaceutical benefits," The European Journal of Health Economics, Springer;Deutsche Gesellschaft für Gesundheitsökonomie (DGGÖ), pages 299-308.
    8. Krasa, Stefan & Yannelis, Nicholas C, 1994. "The Value Allocation of an Economy with Differential Information," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 62(4), pages 881-900, July.
    9. Hart, Sergiu & Mas-Colell, Andreu, 1996. "Bargaining and Value," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 64(2), pages 357-380, March.
    10. Myerson, Roger B, 1984. "Two-Person Bargaining Problems with Incomplete Information," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 52(2), pages 461-487, March.
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    Cited by:

    1. Françoise Forges & Roberto Serrano, 2013. "Cooperative Games With Incomplete Information: Some Open Problems," International Game Theory Review (IGTR), World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., vol. 15(02), pages 1-17.
    2. repec:dau:papers:123456789/8158 is not listed on IDEAS
    3. Kim, Jin Yeub, 2017. "Interim third-party selection in bargaining," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, pages 645-665.
    4. Geoffroy de Clippel, 2010. "Copmment on Egalitarianism under Incomplete Information," Working Papers 2010-4, Brown University, Department of Economics.

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    JEL classification:

    • C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games

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