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A Generalization of the Harsanyi NTU Value to Games with Incomplete Information

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  • Andrés Salamanca

    (SDU - University of Southern Denmark)

Abstract

In this paper, we introduce a solution concept generalizing the Harsanyi non-transferable utility (NTU) value to cooperative games with incomplete information. The so-defined H-solution is characterized by virtual utility scales that extend the Harsanyi-Shapley fictitious weighted-utility transfer procedure. We construct a three-player cooperative game in which Myerson's [Cooperative games with incomplete information. Int. J. Game Theory, 13, 1984, pp. 69-96] generalization of the Shapley NTU value does not capture some "negative" externality generated by the adverse selection. However, when we explicitly compute the H-solution in this game, it turns out that it prescribes a more intuitive outcome taking into account the informational externality mentioned above.

Suggested Citation

  • Andrés Salamanca, 2016. "A Generalization of the Harsanyi NTU Value to Games with Incomplete Information," Working Papers hal-01579898, HAL.
    • Handle: RePEc:hal:wpaper:hal-01579898
    Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://hal.science/hal-01579898v2
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    Cited by:

    1. Andrés Salamanca, 2019. "A Comparison of NTU Values in a Cooperative Game with Incomplete Information," The Journal of Mechanism and Institution Design, Society for the Promotion of Mechanism and Institution Design, University of York, vol. 4(1), pages 109-117, November.
    2. Funaki, Yukihiko & Núñez, Marina, 2024. "Some advances in cooperative game theory: Indivisibilities, externalities and axiomatic approach," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 115(C).
    3. Andrew J. Collins & Sheida Etemadidavan & Wael Khallouli, 2020. "Generating Empirical Core Size Distributions of Hedonic Games using a Monte Carlo Method," Papers 2007.12127, arXiv.org.
    4. Salamanca, Andrés, 2020. "On the values of Bayesian cooperative games with sidepayments," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 108(C), pages 38-49.
    5. Alexander Frug & Malachy James Gavan, 2025. "On the impossibility of stability-based equilibria in infinite horizon: An example," Economics Working Papers 1930, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra.

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    Keywords

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    JEL classification:

    • C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games
    • C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design

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