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A Comparison of NTU Values in a Cooperative Game with Incomplete Information

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  • Andrés Salamanca

    (University of Southern Denmark, Denmark)

Abstract

Several "value-like" solution concepts are computed and compared in a cooperative game with incomplete information and non-transferable utility. We will show that the difference between these values is caused by how payoff strategic possibilities of coalitions of the game are handled.

Suggested Citation

  • Andrés Salamanca, 2019. "A Comparison of NTU Values in a Cooperative Game with Incomplete Information," The Journal of Mechanism and Institution Design, Society for the Promotion of Mechanism and Institution Design, University of York, vol. 4(1), pages 109-117, November.
    • Handle: RePEc:jmi:articl:jmi-v4i1a4
    DOI: 10.22574/jmid.2019.11.004
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. de Clippel, Geoffroy, 2005. "Values for cooperative games with incomplete information: An eloquent example," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 53(1), pages 73-82, October.
    2. Roth, Alvin E, 1980. "Values for Games without Sidepayments: Some Difficulties with Current Concepts," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 48(2), pages 457-465, March.
    3. Andrés Salamanca, 2020. "A generalization of the Harsanyi NTU value to games with incomplete information," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 49(1), pages 195-225, March.
    4. Myerson, Roger B., 2007. "Virtual utility and the core for games with incomplete information," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 136(1), pages 260-285, September.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Cooperative games; incomplete information; non-transferable utility.;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design

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