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An Introduction to Game Theory

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  • Roger B. Myerson

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  • Roger B. Myerson, 1984. "An Introduction to Game Theory," Discussion Papers 623, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  • Handle: RePEc:nwu:cmsems:623
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    File URL: http://www.kellogg.northwestern.edu/research/math/papers/623.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Myerson, Roger B, 1983. "Mechanism Design by an Informed Principal," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 51(6), pages 1767-1797, November.
    2. Rubinstein, Ariel, 1982. "Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 50(1), pages 97-109, January.
    3. Nash, John, 1953. "Two-Person Cooperative Games," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 21(1), pages 128-140, April.
    4. Holmstrom, Bengt & Myerson, Roger B, 1983. "Efficient and Durable Decision Rules with Incomplete Information," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 51(6), pages 1799-1819, November.
    5. Harsanyi, John C, 1995. "Games with Incomplete Information," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 85(3), pages 291-303, June.
    6. Myerson, Roger B, 1984. "Two-Person Bargaining Problems with Incomplete Information," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 52(2), pages 461-487, March.
    7. Samet, Dov, 1985. "An axiomatization of the egalitarian solutions," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 9(2), pages 173-181, April.
    8. Nash, John, 1950. "The Bargaining Problem," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 18(2), pages 155-162, April.
    9. Ehud Kalai & Dov Samet, 1983. "On Weighted Shapley Values," Discussion Papers 602, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
    10. Aumann, Robert J., 1974. "Subjectivity and correlation in randomized strategies," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 1(1), pages 67-96, March.
    11. Bernheim, B Douglas, 1984. "Rationalizable Strategic Behavior," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 52(4), pages 1007-1028, July.
    12. Myerson, R B, 1986. "Acceptable and Predominant Correlated Equilibria," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 15(3), pages 133-154.
    13. Roth, Alvin E, 1980. "Values for Games without Sidepayments: Some Difficulties with Current Concepts," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 48(2), pages 457-465, March.
    14. Aumann, Robert J, 1985. "An Axiomatization of the Non-transferable Utility Value," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 53(3), pages 599-612, May.
    15. Rubinstein, Ariel, 1979. "Equilibrium in supergames with the overtaking criterion," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 21(1), pages 1-9, August.
    16. Myerson, Roger B., 1982. "Optimal coordination mechanisms in generalized principal-agent problems," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 10(1), pages 67-81, June.
    17. Ehud Kalai & Dov Samet, 1982. "Persistent Equilibria in Strategic Games," Discussion Papers 515, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
    18. van Damme, E.E.C., 1984. "A relation between perfect equilibria in extensive form games and proper equilibria in normal form games," Other publications TiSEM 3734d89e-fd5c-4c80-a230-5, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
    19. Kohlberg, Elon & Mertens, Jean-Francois, 1986. "On the Strategic Stability of Equilibria," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 54(5), pages 1003-1037, September.
    20. Paul R. Milgrom & Robert J. Weber, 1985. "Distributional Strategies for Games with Incomplete Information," Mathematics of Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 10(4), pages 619-632, November.
    21. Pearce, David G, 1984. "Rationalizable Strategic Behavior and the Problem of Perfection," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 52(4), pages 1029-1050, July.
    22. Hart, Sergiu & Kurz, Mordecai, 1983. "Endogenous Formation of Coalitions," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 51(4), pages 1047-1064, July.
    23. Crawford, Vincent P, 1985. "Efficient and Durable Decision Rules: A Reformulation," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 53(4), pages 817-835, July.
    24. Drew Fudenberg & Jean Tirole, 1983. "Sequential Bargaining with Incomplete Information," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 50(2), pages 221-247.
    25. Roth, Alvin E & Schoumaker, Francoise, 1983. "Expectations and Reputations in Bargaining: An Experimental Study," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 73(3), pages 362-372, June.
    26. William F. Lucas, 1972. "An Overview of the Mathematical Theory of Games," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 18(5-Part-2), pages 3-19, January.
    27. Joel Sobel & Ichiro Takahashi, 1983. "A Multistage Model of Bargaining," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 50(3), pages 411-426.
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    Cited by:

    1. Roger B. Myerson, 1985. "Negotiation in Games: A Theoretical Overview," Discussion Papers 658, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
    2. repec:eee:labchp:v:2:y:1986:i:c:p:1091-1137 is not listed on IDEAS

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