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Efficient and Durable Decision Rules: A Reformulation

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  • Crawford, Vincent P

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  • Crawford, Vincent P, 1985. "Efficient and Durable Decision Rules: A Reformulation," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 53(4), pages 817-835, July.
  • Handle: RePEc:ecm:emetrp:v:53:y:1985:i:4:p:817-35
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    Cited by:

    1. Watson, Joel, 2002. "Starting Small and Commitment," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 38(1), pages 176-199, January.
    2. Vohra, Rajiv, 1999. "Incomplete Information, Incentive Compatibility, and the Core," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 86(1), pages 123-147, May.
    3. Audrey Hu & Theo Offerman & Liang Zou, 2014. "How Risk Sharing may enhance Efficiency in English Auctions," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 14-015/I, Tinbergen Institute.
    4. Krasa, Stefan, 1999. "Unimprovable Allocations in Economies with Incomplete Information," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 87(1), pages 144-168, July.
    5. Steven G. Medema, 2020. "The Coase Theorem at Sixty," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 58(4), pages 1045-1128, December.
    6. Arnald J. Kanning, 2020. "Agreement by conduct as a coordination device," Mind & Society: Cognitive Studies in Economics and Social Sciences, Springer;Fondazione Rosselli, vol. 19(1), pages 77-90, June.
    7. Jin Yeub Kim, 2022. "Neutral public good mechanisms," PLOS ONE, Public Library of Science, vol. 17(4), pages 1-16, April.
    8. Lagunoff, Roger, 1997. "On the dynamic selection of mechanisms for provision of public projects," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 21(10), pages 1699-1725, August.
    9. Celik, Gorkem & Peters, Michael, 2011. "Equilibrium rejection of a mechanism," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 73(2), pages 375-387.
    10. Watson, Joel, 1999. "Starting Small and Renegotiation," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 85(1), pages 52-90, March.
    11. Vincent P. Crawford, 1985. "Dynamic Games and Dynamic Contract Theory," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 29(2), pages 195-224, June.
    12. Cramton Peter C. & Palfrey Thomas R., 1995. "Ratifiable Mechanisms: Learning from Disagreement," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 10(2), pages 255-283, August.
    13. Vassilakis, Spyros, 1992. "Some economic applications of Scott domains," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 24(2-3), pages 173-208, November.
    14. Larry Samuelson, 2004. "Modeling Knowledge in Economic Analysis," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 42(2), pages 367-403, June.
    15. Roger B. Myerson, 1985. "Negotiation in Games: A Theoretical Overview," Discussion Papers 658, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
    16. Roger B. Myerson, 1984. "An Introduction to Game Theory," Discussion Papers 623, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
    17. Pérez-Nievas, Mikel, 2000. "Interim efficient allocation mechanisms," UC3M Working papers. Economics 7220, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid. Departamento de Economía.
    18. Che, Yeon-Koo & Kim, Jinwoo, 2009. "Optimal collusion-proof auctions," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 144(2), pages 565-603, March.
    19. Picard Pierre & Rey Patrick, 1987. "Incentives in cooperative research and development," CEPREMAP Working Papers (Couverture Orange) 8739, CEPREMAP.
    20. Robert J. Weber, 1985. "Negotiation and Arbitration: A Game-Theoretic Perspective," Discussion Papers 666, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
    21. Fadi Alameddine, 1990. "Some problems of infinite regress in social-choice models: a category theory solution," Working Papers (Old Series) 9016, Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland.

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