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Unimprovable Allocations in Economies with Incomplete Information

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  • Krasa, Stefan

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  • Krasa, Stefan, 1999. "Unimprovable Allocations in Economies with Incomplete Information," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 87(1), pages 144-168, July.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:87:y:1999:i:1:p:144-168
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    1. Leonidas C. Koutsougeras, 1998. "A two-stage core with applications to asset market and differential information economies," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 11(3), pages 563-584.
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    3. Holmstrom, Bengt & Myerson, Roger B, 1983. "Efficient and Durable Decision Rules with Incomplete Information," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 51(6), pages 1799-1819, November.
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    5. Forges, Francoise, 1994. "A note on Pareto optimality in differential information economies," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 46(1), pages 27-31, September.
    6. Douglas Gale, 1996. "Equilibria and Pareto optima of markets with adverse selection (*)," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 7(2), pages 207-235.
    7. KOUTSOUGERAS, Leonidas C., 1998. "A two-stage core with applications to asset market and differential information economies," LIDAM Reprints CORE 1428, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
    8. Guangsug Hahn & Nicholas C. Yannelis, 1997. "Efficiency and incentive compatibility in differential information economies," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 10(3), pages 383-411.
    9. Lacker, Jeffrey & Weinberg, John A, 1993. "A Coalition Proof Equilibrium for a Private Information Credit Economy," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 3(2), pages 279-296, April.
    10. Kahn Charles M. & Mookherjee Dilip, 1995. "Coalition Proof Equilibrium in an Adverse Selection Insurance Economy," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 66(1), pages 113-138, June.
    11. Yannelis, Nicholas C, 1991. "The Core of an Economy with Differential Information," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 1(2), pages 183-197, April.
    12. Tatsuro Ichiishi & Murat R. Sertel, 2005. "Cooperative interim contract and re-contract: Chandler’s M-form firm," Studies in Economic Theory, in: Dionysius Glycopantis & Nicholas C. Yannelis (ed.), Differential Information Economies, pages 297-317, Springer.
    13. John H. Boyd & Edward C. Prescott & Bruce D. Smith, 1988. "Organizations in Economic Analysis," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 21(3), pages 477-491, August.
    14. Geir B. Asheim & Tore Nilssen, 1997. "Insurance monopoly and renegotiation (*)," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 9(2), pages 341-354.
    15. Stefan Krasa & Nicholas C. Yannelis, 2005. "The value allocation of an economy with differential information," Studies in Economic Theory, in: Dionysius Glycopantis & Nicholas C. Yannelis (ed.), Differential Information Economies, pages 507-526, Springer.
    16. Dewatripont, M. & Maskin, E., 1990. "Contract renegotiation in models of asymmetric information," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 34(2-3), pages 311-321, May.
    17. Forges Francoise, 1994. "Posterior Efficiency," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 6(2), pages 238-261, March.
    18. Berliant, Marcus, 1992. "On income taxation and the core," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 56(1), pages 121-141, February.
    19. Robert Wilson, 2005. "Information, efficiency, and the core of an economy," Studies in Economic Theory, in: Dionysius Glycopantis & Nicholas C. Yannelis (ed.), Differential Information Economies, pages 55-64, Springer.
    20. Beaudry, Paul & Poitevin, Michel, 1993. "Signalling and Renegotiation in Contractual Relationships," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 61(4), pages 745-782, July.
    21. Koutsougeras, Leonidas C & Yannelis, Nicholas C, 1993. "Incentive Compatibility and Information Superiority of the Core of an Economy with Differential Information," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 3(2), pages 195-216, April.
    22. Crawford, Vincent P, 1985. "Efficient and Durable Decision Rules: A Reformulation," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 53(4), pages 817-835, July.
    23. George A. Akerlof, 1970. "The Market for "Lemons": Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 84(3), pages 488-500.
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    Cited by:

    1. Neeman, Zvika & Pavlov, Gregory, 2008. "Renegotiation-Proof Mechanism Design," Foerder Institute for Economic Research Working Papers 275717, Tel-Aviv University > Foerder Institute for Economic Research.
    2. Hannu Vartiainen, 2003. "Auction Design without Commitment," Working Papers 2003.24, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
    3. Gretschko, Vitali & Wambach, Achim, 2017. "Contract (re-)negotiation with private and common values," ZEW Discussion Papers 17-056, ZEW - Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research.
    4. Neeman, Zvika & Pavlov, Gregory, 2013. "Ex post renegotiation-proof mechanism design," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 148(2), pages 473-501.
    5. Labadie, Pamela, 2009. "Anonymity and individual risk," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 144(6), pages 2440-2453, November.
    6. Pamela Labadie, 2008. "Retrading in Competitive Equilibria with Adverse Selection," 2008 Meeting Papers 838, Society for Economic Dynamics.
    7. Gretschko, Vitali & Wambach, Achim, 2015. "Common Values and the Coase Conjecture: Inefficiencies in Frictionless Contract (Re-)Negotiation," VfS Annual Conference 2015 (Muenster): Economic Development - Theory and Policy 113064, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.

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