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Non-discriminating renegotiation in a competitive insurance market

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  • Asheim, Geir B.
  • Nilssen, Tore

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  • Asheim, Geir B. & Nilssen, Tore, 1996. "Non-discriminating renegotiation in a competitive insurance market," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 40(9), pages 1717-1736, December.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:eecrev:v:40:y:1996:i:9:p:1717-1736
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    1. Dionne, Georges & Doherty, Neil A, 1994. "Adverse Selection, Commitment, and Renegotiation: Extension to and Evidence from Insurance Markets," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 102(2), pages 209-235, April.
    2. Joseph E. Stiglitz, 1977. "Monopoly, Non-linear Pricing and Imperfect Information: The Insurance Market," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 44(3), pages 407-430.
    3. Holmstrom, Bengt & Myerson, Roger B, 1983. "Efficient and Durable Decision Rules with Incomplete Information," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 51(6), pages 1799-1819, November.
    4. Lacker, Jeffrey & Weinberg, John A, 1993. "A Coalition Proof Equilibrium for a Private Information Credit Economy," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 3(2), pages 279-296, April.
    5. Kahn Charles M. & Mookherjee Dilip, 1995. "Coalition Proof Equilibrium in an Adverse Selection Insurance Economy," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 66(1), pages 113-138, June.
    6. Herschel I. Grossman, 1979. "Adverse Selection, Dissembling, and Competitive Equilibrium," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 10(1), pages 336-343, Spring.
    7. Jeffrey M. Lacker & John A. Weinberg, 1995. "The coalition-proof core in adverse selection economies," Working Paper 94-09, Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond.
    8. John H. Boyd & Edward C. Prescott & Bruce D. Smith, 1988. "Organizations in Economic Analysis," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 21(3), pages 477-491, August.
    9. Spence, Michael, 1978. "Product differentiation and performance in insurance markets," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 10(3), pages 427-447, December.
    10. Barry Nalebuff & Andres Rodriguez & Joseph E. Stiglitz, 1993. "Equilibrium Unemployment as a Worker Screening Device," NBER Working Papers 4357, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    11. Rasmusen, E. & Fernandez, L., 1993. "Perfectly Contestable Monopoly and Adverse Selection," Papers 93-016, Indiana - Center for Econometric Model Research.
    12. McAfee, R Preston & Schwartz, Marius, 1994. "Opportunism in Multilateral Vertical Contracting: Nondiscrimination, Exclusivity, and Uniformity," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 84(1), pages 210-230, March.
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    Cited by:

    1. Diderik Lund & Tore Nilssen, 2004. "Cream Skimming, Dregs Skimming, and Pooling: On the Dynamics of Competitive Screening," The Geneva Papers on Risk and Insurance Theory, Springer;International Association for the Study of Insurance Economics (The Geneva Association), vol. 29(1), pages 23-41, June.
    2. Arthur Snow, 2009. "On the Possibility of Profitable Self-Selection Contracts in Competitive Insurance Markets," Journal of Risk & Insurance, The American Risk and Insurance Association, vol. 76(2), pages 249-259.
    3. Nick Netzer & Florian Scheuer, 2010. "Competitive Markets without Commitment," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 118(6), pages 1079-1109.
    4. Wanda Mimra & Achim Wambach, 2011. "A Game-Theoretic Foundation for the Wilson Equilibrium in Competitive Insurance Markets with Adverse Selection," CESifo Working Paper Series 3412, CESifo Group Munich.
    5. Anastasios Dosis, 2016. "Investment, Adverse Selection and Optimal Redistributive Taxation," Working Papers hal-01285163, HAL.
    6. Inderst, Roman & Wambach, Achim, 2001. "Competitive insurance markets under adverse selection and capacity constraints," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 45(10), pages 1981-1992, December.
    7. Anastasios Dosis, 2016. "On Signalling and Screening in Markets with Asymmetric Information," Working Papers hal-01285190, HAL.
    8. Jeffrey M. Lacker & John A. Weinberg, 1995. "The coalition-proof core in adverse selection economies," Working Paper 94-09, Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond.
    9. Raduna, Daniela Viviana & Roman, Mihai Daniel, 2011. "Risk aversion influence on insurance market," MPRA Paper 37725, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 01 Feb 2012.
    10. Wanda Mimra & Achim Wambach, 2014. "New Developments in the Theory of Adverse Selection in Competitive Insurance," The Geneva Risk and Insurance Review, Palgrave Macmillan;International Association for the Study of Insurance Economics (The Geneva Association), vol. 39(2), pages 136-152, September.
    11. Dosis, Anastasios, 2016. "An Efficient Mechanism for Competitive Markets with Adverse Selection," ESSEC Working Papers WP1604, ESSEC Research Center, ESSEC Business School.
    12. Ania, Ana B. & Troger, Thomas & Wambach, Achim, 2002. "An evolutionary analysis of insurance markets with adverse selection," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 40(2), pages 153-184, August.
    13. Nick Netzer & Florian Scheuer, 2014. "A Game Theoretic Foundation Of Competitive Equilibria With Adverse Selection," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 55, pages 399-422, May.
    14. Willington Manuel & Alegría Alexander, 2012. "Collusion in a One-Period Insurance Market with Adverse Selection," The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, De Gruyter, vol. 12(1), pages 1-32, April.
    15. Wang, Yanguo & Jaenicke, Edward C., 2005. "Pooling, Separating, and Cream-Skimming In Relative-Performance Contracts," 2005 International Congress, August 23-27, 2005, Copenhagen, Denmark 24639, European Association of Agricultural Economists.
    16. Anastasios Dosis, 2016. "An Efficient Mechanism for Competitive Markets with Adverse Selection," Working Papers hal-01282772, HAL.
    17. Dosis, Anastasios, 2016. "Investment, Adverse Selection and Optimal Redistributive Taxation," ESSEC Working Papers WP1605, ESSEC Research Center, ESSEC Business School.
    18. Wang, Yanguo & Jaenicke, Edward C., 2005. "Pooling, Separating, and Cream-Skimming In Relative-Performance Contracts," 2005 Annual meeting, July 24-27, Providence, RI 19522, American Agricultural Economics Association (New Name 2008: Agricultural and Applied Economics Association).
    19. John A. Weinberg, 1995. "The adverse selection approach to financial intermediation: some characteristics of the equilibrium financial structure," Working Paper 95-05, Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond.
    20. Dosis, Anastasios, 2016. "On Signalling and Screening," ESSEC Working Papers WP1608, ESSEC Research Center, ESSEC Business School.
    21. repec:eee:mateco:v:75:y:2018:i:c:p:140-149 is not listed on IDEAS

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