IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/fip/fedmwp/385.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Organizations in economic analysis

Author

Listed:
  • John H. Boyd
  • Edward C. Prescott
  • Bruce Smith

Abstract

Three economic environments are reviewed, and in each organizations play an essential role. For an adverse selection insurance economy, we find that when mutual insurance arrangements are permitted an equilibrium necessarily exists and is optimal. This example, and the two others, illustrate the problems that may result from imposing organizational structure on an environment rather than permitting the structure to be determined endogenously.

Suggested Citation

  • John H. Boyd & Edward C. Prescott & Bruce Smith, 1988. "Organizations in economic analysis," Working Papers 385, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis.
    • Handle: RePEc:fip:fedmwp:385
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.minneapolisfed.org/research/common/pub_detail.cfm?pb_autonum_id=572
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    Other versions of this item:

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Pierre Picard, 2014. "Participating Insurance Contracts and the Rothschild-Stiglitz Equilibrium Puzzle," The Geneva Risk and Insurance Review, Palgrave Macmillan;International Association for the Study of Insurance Economics (The Geneva Association), vol. 39(2), pages 153-175, September.
    2. Zou, L., 1989. "Ownership structure and efficiency : An incentive mechanism approach," Discussion Paper 1989-55, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
    3. Kilenthong, Weerachart T. & Qin, Cheng-Zhong, 2014. "Trade through endogenous intermediaries," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 50(C), pages 262-268.
    4. Zou, L., 1993. "Ownership structure and efficiency : An incentive mechanism approach," Other publications TiSEM a72a05c2-b3f2-47c7-a003-f, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
    5. Lazarova, E.A. & Borm, P.E.M. & van Velzen, S., 2005. "Contracts and Insurance Group Formation by Myopic Players," Discussion Paper 2005-89, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
    6. Alessandro Giovannini & Maurizio Iacopetta & Raoul Minetti, 2013. "Financial Markets, Banks, and Growth : Disentangling the links," Revue de l'OFCE, Presses de Sciences-Po, vol. 0(5), pages 105-147.
    7. Cheng Wang & Stephen D. Williamson, 1993. "Adverse Selection in Credit Markets with Costly Screening," Finance 9310001, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 10 Nov 1993.
    8. Emiliya Lazarova & Peter Borm & Bas Velzen, 2011. "Coalitional games and contracts based on individual deviations," TOP: An Official Journal of the Spanish Society of Statistics and Operations Research, Springer;Sociedad de Estadística e Investigación Operativa, vol. 19(2), pages 507-520, December.
    9. Krasa, Stefan, 1999. "Unimprovable Allocations in Economies with Incomplete Information," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 87(1), pages 144-168, July.
    10. Lacker, Jeffrey & Weinberg, John A, 1993. "A Coalition Proof Equilibrium for a Private Information Credit Economy," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 3(2), pages 279-296, April.
    11. Hakenes, Hendrik & Schnabel, Isabel, 2006. "The Threat of Capital Drain: A Rationale for Public Banks?," Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems 107, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich.
    12. Demir, Ayse U. & Hall, Stephen G., 2017. "Financial structure and economic development: Evidence on the view of ‘new structuralism’," International Review of Financial Analysis, Elsevier, vol. 52(C), pages 252-259.
    13. Christopher Ferrall & Kjell G. Salvanes & Erik S, 2009. "Wages And Seniority When Coworkers Matter: Estimating A Joint Production Economy Using Norwegian Administrative Data," Working Paper 1200, Economics Department, Queen's University.
    14. Kahn, Charles M. & Mookherjee, Dilip, 1995. "Market failure with moral hazard and side trading," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 58(2), pages 159-184, October.
    15. Asheim, Geir B. & Nilssen, Tore, 1996. "Non-discriminating renegotiation in a competitive insurance market," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 40(9), pages 1717-1736, December.
    16. Zou, Liang, 1992. "Ownership structure and efficiency: An incentive mechanism approach," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 16(3), pages 399-431, September.
    17. Pamela Labadie, 2007. "Anonymity and Individual Risk," 2007 Meeting Papers 637, Society for Economic Dynamics.
    18. Alberto Bisin & Piero Gottardi, 2006. "Efficient Competitive Equilibria with Adverse Selection," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 114(3), pages 485-516, June.
    19. Zou, L., 1989. "Ownership structure and efficiency : An incentive mechanism approach," Other publications TiSEM 14b0756c-17d9-4b9e-92cd-b, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
    20. Mingming Leng & Mahmut Parlar, 2009. "Allocation of Cost Savings in a Three-Level Supply Chain with Demand Information Sharing: A Cooperative-Game Approach," Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 57(1), pages 200-213, February.
    21. Jeffrey M. Lacker & John A. Weinberg, 1995. "The coalition-proof core in adverse selection economies," Working Paper 94-09, Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond.
    22. Daripa, Arup, 2008. "Optimal collective contract without peer information or peer monitoring," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 86(1), pages 147-163, April.
    23. repec:hal:spmain:info:hdl:2441/6o65lgig8d0qcro9p14jk1001 is not listed on IDEAS

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:fip:fedmwp:385. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Kate Hansel (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/cfrbmus.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.