Organizations in Economic Analysis
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- Ferrall, Christopher & Salvanes, Kjell G. & Sørensen, Erik Ø., 2009.
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2006_11, Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods.
- Hakenes, Hendrik & Schnabel, Isabel, 2006. "The Threat of Capital Drain: A Rationale for Public Banks?," Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems 107, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich.
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- repec:eee:finana:v:52:y:2017:i:c:p:252-259 is not listed on IDEAS
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