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Debt contracts and cooperative improvements

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  • Krasa, Stefan
  • Sharma, Tridib
  • Villamil, Anne P.

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  • Krasa, Stefan & Sharma, Tridib & Villamil, Anne P., 2005. "Debt contracts and cooperative improvements," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 41(7), pages 857-874, November.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:mateco:v:41:y:2005:i:7:p:857-874
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Yannelis, Nicholas C, 1991. "The Core of an Economy with Differential Information," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 1(2), pages 183-197, April.
    2. Guillaume Carlier & Ludovic Renou, 2005. "A costly state verification model with diversity of opinions," Post-Print hal-00404932, HAL.
    3. Holmstrom, Bengt & Myerson, Roger B, 1983. "Efficient and Durable Decision Rules with Incomplete Information," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 51(6), pages 1799-1819, November.
    4. KOUTSOUGERAS, Leonidas C. & YANNELIS, Nicholas C., 1999. "Bounded rational learning in differential information economies: core and value," LIDAM Reprints CORE 1429, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
    5. Forges Francoise, 1994. "Posterior Efficiency," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 6(2), pages 238-261, March.
    6. Anne Villamil & Stefan Krasa & Tridib Sharma, 2004. "Enforcement and Firm Finance," 2004 Meeting Papers 868, Society for Economic Dynamics.
    7. Tatsuro Ichiishi & Murat R. Sertel, 2005. "Cooperative interim contract and re-contract: Chandler’s M-form firm," Studies in Economic Theory, in: Dionysius Glycopantis & Nicholas C. Yannelis (ed.), Differential Information Economies, pages 297-317, Springer.
    8. repec:ebl:ecbull:v:7:y:2003:i:5:p:1-9 is not listed on IDEAS
    9. Stefan Krasa & Anne P. Villamil, 2000. "Optimal Contracts when Enforcement Is a Decision Variable," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 68(1), pages 119-134, January.
    10. Guangsug Hahn & Nicholas C. Yannelis, 1997. "Efficiency and incentive compatibility in differential information economies," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 10(3), pages 383-411.
    11. Stefan Krasa & Nicholas C. Yannelis, 2005. "The value allocation of an economy with differential information," Studies in Economic Theory, in: Dionysius Glycopantis & Nicholas C. Yannelis (ed.), Differential Information Economies, pages 507-526, Springer.
    12. Stefan Krasa & Nicholas C. Yannelis, 2005. "Existence and properties of a value allocation for an economy with differential information," Studies in Economic Theory, in: Dionysius Glycopantis & Nicholas C. Yannelis (ed.), Differential Information Economies, pages 527-540, Springer.
    13. Koutsougeras, Leonidas C & Yannelis, Nicholas C, 1993. "Incentive Compatibility and Information Superiority of the Core of an Economy with Differential Information," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 3(2), pages 195-216, April.
    14. Guillaume Carlier & Ludovic Renou, 2005. "A costly state verification model with diversity of opinions," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 25(2), pages 497-504, February.
    15. Koutsougeras, Leonidas & Yannelis, Nicholas C., 1999. "Bounded rational learning in differential information economies: core and value," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 31(3), pages 373-391, April.
    16. Tridib Sharma, 2003. "Optimal Contracts when Enforcement is a Decision Variable: A Comment," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 71(1), pages 387-390, January.
    17. Ludovic Renou & Guillaume Carlier, 2003. "Existence and monotonicity of optimal debt contracts in costly state verification models," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 7(5), pages 1-9.
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    Cited by:

    1. Antunes, António & Cavalcanti, Tiago & Villamil, Anne, 2008. "Computing general equilibrium models with occupational choice and financial frictions," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 44(7-8), pages 553-568, July.
    2. Diemo Dietrich & Achim Hauck, 2020. "Interbank borrowing and lending between financially constrained banks," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 70(2), pages 347-385, September.
    3. Stefan Krasa & Tridib Sharma & Anne Villamil, 2008. "Bankruptcy and firm finance," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 36(2), pages 239-266, August.
    4. Antunes, António & Cavalcanti, Tiago & Villamil, Anne, 2008. "Computing general equilibrium models with occupational choice and financial frictions," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 44(7-8), pages 553-568, July.
    5. Josef Schosser & Jochen Wilhelm, 2018. "Costly state verification and truthtelling: a note on the theory of debt contracts," Economic Theory Bulletin, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 6(2), pages 129-139, October.

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