Enforcement and Firm Finance
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References listed on IDEAS
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CitationsCitations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Hans K. Hvide & Tore Leite, 2003.
"A Theory of Capital Structure with Strategic Defaults and Priority Violations,"
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More about this item
- G31 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Capital Budgeting; Fixed Investment and Inventory Studies
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