Optimal Debt Contracts in Emerging Markets with Multiple Investors
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"Gravitační a fiskální modely státní podpory exportních úvěrů v České republice
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More about this item
Keywordsemerging markets; debt; Multiple Lenders; Supply Chains;
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- G33 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Bankruptcy; Liquidation
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