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Costly state verification and debt contracts: a critical resume

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  • Attar, Andrea
  • Campioni, Eloisa

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  • Attar, Andrea & Campioni, Eloisa, 2003. "Costly state verification and debt contracts: a critical resume," Research in Economics, Elsevier, vol. 57(4), pages 315-343, December.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:reecon:v:57:y:2003:i:4:p:315-343
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    Cited by:

    1. ATTAR, Andréa, 2003. "Financial contracting along the business cycle," LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE 2003069, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
    2. Martin Pollrich, 2017. "Mediated audits," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 48(1), pages 44-68, March.
    3. Philipp Meyer-Brauns, 2014. "Financial Contracting with Tax Evaders," Working Papers tax-mpg-rps-2014-01, Max Planck Institute for Tax Law and Public Finance.
    4. Ludovic Renou, 2008. "Multi-lender coalitions in costly state verification models," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 36(3), pages 407-433, September.
    5. Ordoñez, Guillermo, 2018. "Confidence banking and strategic default," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 100(C), pages 101-113.
    6. Meyer-Brauns, Philipp, 2014. "Financial Contracting with Tax Evaders," VfS Annual Conference 2014 (Hamburg): Evidence-based Economic Policy 100524, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.

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