Online Appendix to Collateralized Debt as the Optimal Contract
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Note: The original article is published in the Review of Economic Dynamics, 2001(4), pages 842-859.
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- Jeffrey Lacker, 2001. "Collateralized Debt as the Optimal Contract," Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, vol. 4(4), pages 842-859, October.
References listed on IDEAS
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- Jeffrey Lacker, 2001.
"Collateralized Debt as the Optimal Contract,"
Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, vol. 4(4), pages 842-859, October.
- Jeffrey M. Lacker, 1998. "Collateralized debt as the optimal contract," Working Paper 98-04, Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond.
- Arrow, Kenneth J, 1974. "Limited Knowledge and Economic Analysis," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 64(1), pages 1-10, March.
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- Jeffrey Lacker, 2001.
"Collateralized Debt as the Optimal Contract,"
Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, vol. 4(4), pages 842-859, October.
- Jeffrey Lacker, 2001. "Online Appendix to Collateralized Debt as the Optimal Contract," Online Appendices lacker01, Review of Economic Dynamics.
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JEL classification:
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- G10 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - General (includes Measurement and Data)
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