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Risky Collateral and Deposit Insurance

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  • Kocherlakota Narayana R

    (University of Minnesota and Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis)

Abstract

This paper provides a new rationalization for deposit insurance and systemic disintermediations. I consider an environment in which borrowers face no penalty for failing to repay obligations except the loss of their collateral. I assume that this collateral has aggregate risk. For a subset of the exogenous parameters, I demonstrate that an optimal arrangement features deposit insurance. For a strictly smaller set of parameters, it is optimal in some states of the world to have systemic distintermediations and concomitant falls in real output.

Suggested Citation

  • Kocherlakota Narayana R, 2001. "Risky Collateral and Deposit Insurance," The B.E. Journal of Macroeconomics, De Gruyter, vol. 1(1), pages 1-20, February.
    • Handle: RePEc:bpj:bejmac:v:advances.1:y:2001:i:1:n:2
    DOI: 10.2202/1534-6013.1002
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    Cited by:

    1. Arellano, Cristina & Kocherlakota, Narayana, 2014. "Internal debt crises and sovereign defaults," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 68(S), pages 68-80.
    2. Lubello, Federico & Petrella, Ivan & Santoro, Emiliano, 2019. "Bank assets, liquidity and credit cycles," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 105(C), pages 265-282.
    3. Koeppl, Thorsten & MacGee, James, 2005. "What Banks Do and Markets Don’t: Cross-subsidization," Queen's Economics Department Working Papers 273528, Queen's University - Department of Economics.
    4. Narayana R. Kocherlakota & Ilhyock Shim, 2007. "Forbearance and Prompt Corrective Action," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 39(5), pages 1107-1129, August.
    5. Makoto Watanabe & Vyacheslav Arbuzov & Yu Awaya & Hiroki Fukai, "undated". "Endogenous Repo Cycles," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 19-019/VII, Tinbergen Institute.
    6. Parlatore, Cecilia, 2019. "Collateralizing liquidity," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 131(2), pages 299-322.
    7. Ewerhart, Christian & Tapking, Jens, 2008. "Repo markets, counterparty risk and the 2007/2008 liquidity crisis," Working Paper Series 909, European Central Bank.
    8. Charles M. Kahn & William Roberds, 2002. "Payments settlement under limited enforcement: Private versus public systems," FRB Atlanta Working Paper 2002-33, Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta.
    9. Ilhyock Shim, 2011. "Dynamic Prudential Regulation: Is Prompt Corrective Action Optimal?," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 43(8), pages 1625-1661, December.
    10. Yu Awaya & Hiroki Fukai & Makoto Watanabe, 2021. "A Model Of Collateral: Endogenizing The Borrowing Constraint," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 62(3), pages 1131-1151, August.
    11. Shengxing Zhang, 2014. "Collateral Risk, Repo Rollover and Shadow Banking," 2014 Meeting Papers 562, Society for Economic Dynamics.
    12. Koeppl, Thorsten V. & MacGee, James C., 2009. "What broad banks do, and markets don't: Cross-subsidization," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 53(2), pages 222-236, February.
    13. Thorsten V. Koppl & James MacGee, 2001. "Limited enforcement and efficient interbank arrangements," Working Papers 608, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis.
    14. Federico Lubello & Ivan Petrella & Emiliano Santoro, 2018. "Chained financial frictions and credit cycles," BCL working papers 116, Central Bank of Luxembourg.
    15. Kahn, Charles M. & Roberds, William, 2009. "Why pay? An introduction to payments economics," Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, vol. 18(1), pages 1-23, January.
    16. Charles M. Kahn & William Roberds, 2009. "Payments Settlement: Tiering in Private and Public Systems," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 41(5), pages 855-884, August.

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