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Forbearance and Prompt Corrective Action

Author

Listed:
  • Narayana R Kocherlakota
  • Ilhyock Shim

Abstract

This paper investigates whether a bank regulator should terminate problem banks promptly or exercise forbearance. We construct a dynamic model economy in which entrepreneurs pledge collateral, borrow from banks, and invest in long-term projects. We assume that collateral value has aggregate risk over time, that in any period entrepreneurs can abscond with the projects but losing the collateral, and that depositors can withdraw deposits. We show that optimal regulation exhibits forbearance if the ex-ante probability of collapse in collateral value is sufficiently low, but exhibits prompt termination of problem banks if this probability is sufficiently high.
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(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)
(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)
(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)
(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)
(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)
(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)

Suggested Citation

  • Narayana R Kocherlakota & Ilhyock Shim, 2005. "Forbearance and Prompt Corrective Action," Levine's Bibliography 784828000000000512, UCLA Department of Economics.
    • Handle: RePEc:cla:levrem:784828000000000512
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    File URL: http://www.econ.umn.edu/~nkocher/JMCBrevision.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Maximilian J.B. Hall, 1998. "Financial Reform in Japan," Books, Edward Elgar Publishing, number 1552, June.
    2. Kocherlakota Narayana R, 2001. "Risky Collateral and Deposit Insurance," The B.E. Journal of Macroeconomics, De Gruyter, vol. 1(1), pages 1-20, February.
    3. Dekle, Robert & Kletzer, Kenneth, 2003. "The Japanese Banking Crisis and Economic Growth: Theoretical and Empirical Implications of Deposit Guarantees and Weak Financial Regulation," Santa Cruz Department of Economics, Working Paper Series qt0t6321ds, Department of Economics, UC Santa Cruz.
    4. Dekle, Robert & Kletzer, Kenneth, 2003. "The Japanese banking crisis and economic growth: Theoretical and empirical implications of deposit guarantees and weak financial regulation," Journal of the Japanese and International Economies, Elsevier, vol. 17(3), pages 305-335, September.
    5. Sleet, Christopher & Smith, Bruce D, 2000. "Deposit Insurance and Lender-of-Last-Resort Functions," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 32(3), pages 518-575, August.
    6. Ilhyock Shim, 2011. "Dynamic Prudential Regulation: Is Prompt Corrective Action Optimal?," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 43(8), pages 1625-1661, December.
    7. Bengt Holmstrom & Jean Tirole, 1998. "Private and Public Supply of Liquidity," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 106(1), pages 1-40, February.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Ilhyock Shim & Goetz Von Peter, 2007. "Distress Selling and Asset Market Feedback," Financial Markets, Institutions & Instruments, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 16(5), pages 243-291, December.
    2. Eijffinger, Sylvester & Nijskens, Rob, 2011. "Complementing Bagehot: Illiquidity and insolvency resolution," CEPR Discussion Papers 8603, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    3. Daly, Kevin & Batten, Jonathan A. & Mishra, Anil V. & Choudhury, Tonmoy, 2019. "Contagion risk in global banking sector," Journal of International Financial Markets, Institutions and Money, Elsevier, vol. 63(C).
    4. Arellano, Cristina & Kocherlakota, Narayana, 2014. "Internal debt crises and sovereign defaults," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 68(S), pages 68-80.
    5. Xi Chen & Michael Funke, 2013. "Real-Time Warning Signs of Emerging and Collapsing Chinese House Price Bubbles," National Institute Economic Review, National Institute of Economic and Social Research, vol. 223(1), pages 39-48, February.
    6. Xavier Freixas & Jean-Charles Rochet, 2012. "Taming SIFIs," Economics Working Papers 1328, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra.
    7. Marcella Lucchetta & Michele Moretto & Bruno Maria Parigi, 2018. "Systematic Risk, Bank Moral Hazard, and Bailouts," CESifo Working Paper Series 6878, CESifo.
    8. Chuang‐Chang Chang & San‐Lin Chung & Ruey‐Jenn Ho & Yu‐Jen Hsiao, 2022. "Revisiting the valuation of deposit insurance," Journal of Futures Markets, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 42(1), pages 77-103, January.
    9. Robert E. Hall, 2008. "Equity Depletion from Government-Guaranteed Debt," NBER Working Papers 14581, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    10. Ilhyock Shim, 2011. "Dynamic Prudential Regulation: Is Prompt Corrective Action Optimal?," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 43(8), pages 1625-1661, December.
    11. Loveland, Robert, 2016. "How prompt was regulatory corrective action during the financial crisis?," Journal of Financial Stability, Elsevier, vol. 25(C), pages 16-36.
    12. Xavier Freixas & Bruno Maria Parigi, 2007. "Banking Regulation and Prompt Corrective Action," CESifo Working Paper Series 2136, CESifo.
    13. Bosma, Jakob J., 2016. "Dueling policies: Why systemic risk taxation can fail," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 87(C), pages 132-147.
    14. Tonmoy Choudhury & Simone Scagnelli & Jaime Yong & Zhaoyong Zhang, 2021. "Non-Traditional Systemic Risk Contagion within the Chinese Banking Industry," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 13(14), pages 1-16, July.
    15. Masahiko Egami & Tadao Oryu, 2013. "An Excursion-Theoretic Approach to Regulator's Bank Reorganization Problem," Papers 1311.3019, arXiv.org.
    16. Eijffinger, Sylvester & Nijskens, Rob, 2012. "A dynamic analysis of bank bailouts and constructive ambiguity," CEPR Discussion Papers 8953, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    17. Xavier Freixas & Jean-Charles Rochet, 2013. "Taming Systemically Important Financial Institutions," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 45, pages 37-58, August.
    18. Masahiko Egami & Tadao Oryu, 2015. "An Excursion-Theoretic Approach to Regulator’s Bank Reorganization Problem," Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 63(3), pages 527-539, June.
    19. Prateek Sharma, 2022. "Management quality, M-rating, and bank failures," SN Business & Economics, Springer, vol. 2(2), pages 1-32, February.
    20. Vollmer, Uwe & Wiese, Harald, 2013. "Minimum capital requirements, bank supervision and special resolution schemes. Consequences for bank risk-taking," Journal of Financial Stability, Elsevier, vol. 9(4), pages 487-497.
    21. Marcella Lucchetta & Michele Moretto & Bruno M. Parigi, 2019. "Optimal bailouts, bank’s incentive and risk," Annals of Finance, Springer, vol. 15(3), pages 369-399, September.
    22. Capponi, Agostino & Dooley, John M. & Oet, Mikhail V. & Ong, Stephen J., 2017. "Capital and resolution policies: The US interbank market," Journal of Financial Stability, Elsevier, vol. 30(C), pages 229-239.
    23. Marcella Lucchetta & Michele Moretto & Bruno Maria Parigi, 2018. "Systematic Risk, Bank Moral Hazard, and Bailouts," CESifo Working Paper Series 6878, CESifo.
    24. David VanHoose, 2007. "Market Discipline and Supervisory Discretion in Banking: Reinforcing or Conflicting Pillars of Basel II?," NFI Working Papers 2007-WP-06, Indiana State University, Scott College of Business, Networks Financial Institute.

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D81 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Criteria for Decision-Making under Risk and Uncertainty
    • G21 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages
    • G28 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Government Policy and Regulation

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