Minimum capital requirements, bank supervision and special resolution schemes. Consequences for bank risk-taking
This paper analyzes the incentive effects of special bank resolution schemes which were introduced during the recent financial crisis. These schemes allow regulators to take control over a systemically important financial institution before bankruptcy. We ask how special resolution schemes influence banks’ risk-taking and whether regulators should combine them with minimum capital requirements. We model a single bank which is supervised by a regulator who receives an imperfect signal about the bank's probability of success. We find that capital requirements are better than resolution from a welfare point of view if the quality of the signal is low, if it is difficult for the bank to attract deposits, or if the project return is low.
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