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Regulation and Banking Stability: A Survey of Empirical Studies

  • TCHANA TCHANA, Fulbert

This paper brings together and adds structure to the empirical literature on the link between banking regulation and banking system stability. In addition to clarifying the theoretical underpinnings for studying banking regulation, it points to several directions for future empirical research, necessary to fill the gaps in our understanding of the link between banking regulation and stability. The paper starts with a review of the literature on the design of banking regulation and its link with stability, followed by an assessment of the most common methodologies used in this literature.The paper then reviews the empirical literature of various banking regulations. This is followed by a proposal on the new directions for research of the link between banking regulation and banking system stability.

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File URL: http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/9298/1/MPRA_paper_9298.pdf
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Paper provided by University Library of Munich, Germany in its series MPRA Paper with number 9298.

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Date of creation: 30 May 2008
Date of revision: 30 May 2008
Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:9298
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  3. Demirguc-Kunt, Asli & Detragiache, Enrica & Tressel, Thierry, 2006. "Banking on the principles : compliance with Basel Core Principles and bank soundness," Policy Research Working Paper Series 3954, The World Bank.
  4. Franklin Allen & Richard Herring, 2001. "Banking Regulation versus Securities Market Regulation," Center for Financial Institutions Working Papers 01-29, Wharton School Center for Financial Institutions, University of Pennsylvania.
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  6. Stephen Morris & Hyun Song Shin, 2000. "Rethinking Multiple Equilibria in Macroeconomic Modelling," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1260, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
  7. Xavier Freixas & Bruno Parigi & Jean Charles Rochet, 1998. "Systemic risk, interbank relations and liquidity provision by the Central Bank," Economics Working Papers 440, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra, revised Sep 1999.
  8. Nier, Erlend & Baumann, Ursel, 2006. "Market discipline, disclosure and moral hazard in banking," Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, vol. 15(3), pages 332-361, July.
  9. Bernanke, Ben & Gertler, Mark, 1989. "Agency Costs, Net Worth, and Business Fluctuations," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 79(1), pages 14-31, March.
  10. Douglas W. Diamond & Raghuram G. Rajan, . "Liquidity Risk, Liquidity Creation and Financial Fragility: A Theory of Banking," CRSP working papers 476, Center for Research in Security Prices, Graduate School of Business, University of Chicago.
  11. Ho, Tai-Kuang & von Hagen, Jürgen, 2004. "Money Market Pressure and the Determinants of Banking Crises," CEPR Discussion Papers 4651, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  12. Morris, Stephen & Shin, Hyun Song, 1998. "Unique Equilibrium in a Model of Self-Fulfilling Currency Attacks," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 88(3), pages 587-97, June.
  13. Demirguc-Kunt, Asli & Huizinga, Harry, 2004. "Market discipline and deposit insurance," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 51(2), pages 375-399, March.
  14. Diamond, Douglas W & Dybvig, Philip H, 1983. "Bank Runs, Deposit Insurance, and Liquidity," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 91(3), pages 401-19, June.
  15. Dewatripont, Mathias & Tirole, Jean, 1992. "Efficient Governance Structure : Implications for Banking Regulation," IDEI Working Papers 18, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse.
  16. Rime, Bertrand, 2001. "Capital requirements and bank behaviour: Empirical evidence for Switzerland," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 25(4), pages 789-805, April.
  17. V.V. Chari & Ravi Jagannathan, 1984. "Banking Panics," Discussion Papers 618, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  18. Demirguc-Kunt, Asli & Detragiache, Enrica & Gupta, Poonam, 2006. "Inside the crisis: An empirical analysis of banking systems in distress," Journal of International Money and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 25(5), pages 702-718, August.
  19. Douglas W. Diamond & Raghuram G. Rajan, 2000. "Banks, Short Term Debt and Financial Crises: Theory, Policy Implications and Applications," NBER Working Papers 7764, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  20. Joseph G. Haubrich & Paul Wachtel, 1993. "Capital requirements and shifts in commercial bank portfolios," Economic Review, Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland, issue Q III, pages 2-15.
  21. Jacques, Kevin & Nigro, Peter, 1997. "Risk-based capital, portfolio risk, and bank capital: A simultaneous equations approach," Journal of Economics and Business, Elsevier, vol. 49(6), pages 533-547.
  22. Beck, Thorsten & Demirguc-Kunt, Asli & Levine, Ross, 2006. "Bank supervision and corruption in lending," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 53(8), pages 2131-2163, November.
  23. Barry Eichengreen & Carlos Arteta, 2001. "Banking Crises in Emerging Markets: Presumptions and Evidence," Macroeconomics 0012012, EconWPA.
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  25. Noy, Ilan, 2004. "Financial liberalization, prudential supervision, and the onset of banking crises," Emerging Markets Review, Elsevier, vol. 5(3), pages 341-359, September.
  26. Blum, Jurg, 1999. "Do capital adequacy requirements reduce risks in banking?," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 23(5), pages 755-771, May.
  27. Ben Bernanke & Mark Gertler, 1987. "Financial Fragility and Economic Performance," NBER Working Papers 2318, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  28. Chari, V V & Jagannathan, Ravi, 1988. " Banking Panics, Information, and Rational Expectations Equilibrium," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 43(3), pages 749-61, July.
  29. Gonzalez, Francisco, 2005. "Bank regulation and risk-taking incentives: An international comparison of bank risk," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 29(5), pages 1153-1184, May.
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  35. Cull, Robert & Senbet, Lemma W. & Sorge, Marco, 2001. "Deposit insurance and financial development," Policy Research Working Paper Series 2682, The World Bank.
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  39. Beck, Thorsten & Demirguc-Kunt, Asli & Levine, Ross, 2006. "Bank concentration, competition, and crises: First results," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 30(5), pages 1581-1603, May.
  40. Alexandra Lai, 2002. "Modelling Financial Instability: A Survey of the Literature," Working Papers 02-12, Bank of Canada.
  41. Dahl, Drew & Spivey, Michael F., 1995. "Prompt corrective action and bank efforts to recover from undercapitalization," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 19(2), pages 225-243, May.
  42. Koehn, Michael & Santomero, Anthony M, 1980. " Regulation of Bank Capital and Portfolio Risk," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 35(5), pages 1235-44, December.
  43. Donaldson, R. Glen, 1992. "Costly liquidation, interbank trade, bank runs and panics," Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, vol. 2(1), pages 59-82, March.
  44. Shrieves, Ronald E. & Dahl, Drew, 1992. "The relationship between risk and capital in commercial banks," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 16(2), pages 439-457, April.
  45. Itay Goldstein & Ady Pauzner, 2005. "Demand-Deposit Contracts and the Probability of Bank Runs," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 60(3), pages 1293-1327, 06.
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