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The Empirics of Banking Regulation

  • TCHANA TCHANA, Fulbert

This paper assesses empirically whether banking regulation is effective at preventing banking crises. We use a monthly index of banking system fragility, which captures almost every source of risk in the banking system, to estimate the effect of regulatory measures (entry restriction, reserve requirement, deposit insurance, and capital adequacy requirement) on banking stability in the context of a Markov-switching model. We apply this method to the Indonesian banking system, which has been subject to several regulatory changes over the last couple of decades, and at the same time, has experienced a severe systemic crisis. We draw from this research the following findings: (i) entry restriction reduces crisis duration and also the probability of their occurrence; (ii) larger reserve requirements reduce crisis duration, but increase banking instability; (iii) deposit insurance increases banking system stability and reduces crisis duration. (vi) capital adequacy requirement improves stability and reduces the expected duration of banking crises.

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Paper provided by University Library of Munich, Germany in its series MPRA Paper with number 9299.

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Date of creation: 15 Jun 2008
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Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:9299
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  1. Blum, Jurg, 1999. "Do capital adequacy requirements reduce risks in banking?," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 23(5), pages 755-771, May.
  2. repec:ebl:ecbull:v:28:y:2002:i:6:p:a0 is not listed on IDEAS
  3. Diamond, Douglas W & Dybvig, Philip H, 1983. "Bank Runs, Deposit Insurance, and Liquidity," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 91(3), pages 401-19, June.
  4. Coe, Patrick J, 2002. "Financial Crisis and the Great Depression: A Regime Switching Approach," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 34(1), pages 76-93, February.
  5. Asli Demirguc-Kunt & Edward J. Kane & Luc Laeven, 2007. "Determinants of Deposit-Insurance Adoption and Design," NBER Working Papers 12862, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  6. TCHANA TCHANA, Fulbert, 2008. "Regulation and Banking Stability: A Survey of Empirical Studies," MPRA Paper 9298, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 30 May 2008.
  7. Andrew J. Filardo, 1993. "Business cycle phases and their transitional dynamics," Research Working Paper 93-14, Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City.
  8. Eichengreen, Barry & Rose, Andrew K & Wyplosz, Charles, 1996. "Contagious Currency Crises," CEPR Discussion Papers 1453, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  9. Eichengreen, Barry & Rose, Andrew K. & Wyplosz, Charles, 1995. "Speculative Attacks on Pegged Exchange Rates: An Empirical Exploration with Special Reference to the European Monetary System," Center for International and Development Economics Research (CIDER) Working Papers 233397, University of California-Berkeley, Department of Economics.
  10. Demirguc-Kunt, Asli & Detragiache, Enrica, 2002. "Does deposit insurance increase banking system stability? An empirical investigation," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 49(7), pages 1373-1406, October.
  11. Bryant, John, 1980. "A model of reserves, bank runs, and deposit insurance," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 4(4), pages 335-344, December.
  12. Morrison, Alan & White, Lucy, 2004. "Crises and Capital Requirements in Banking," CEPR Discussion Papers 4364, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  13. Filardo, Andrew J. & Gordon, Stephen F., 1998. "Business cycle durations," Journal of Econometrics, Elsevier, vol. 85(1), pages 99-123, July.
  14. Scott E. Hein & Jonathan D. Stewart, 2002. "Reserve requirements: A modern perspective," Economic Review, Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta, issue Q4, pages 41-52.
  15. Tai-kuang Ho, 2004. "How Useful are Regime-Switching Models in Banking Crises Identification?," Econometric Society 2004 Far Eastern Meetings 764, Econometric Society.
  16. Maddala, G.S., 1986. "Disequilibrium, self-selection, and switching models," Handbook of Econometrics, in: Z. Griliches† & M. D. Intriligator (ed.), Handbook of Econometrics, edition 1, volume 3, chapter 28, pages 1633-1688 Elsevier.
  17. Demirguc-Kunt, Asli & Detragiache, Enrica & Gupta, Poonam, 2000. "Inside the crisis : an empirical analysis of banking systems in distress," Policy Research Working Paper Series 2431, The World Bank.
  18. René Garcia, 1995. "Asymptotic Null Distribution of the Likelihood Ratio Test in Markov Switching Models," CIRANO Working Papers 95s-07, CIRANO.
  19. Franklin Allen & Douglas Gale, 2003. "Financial Intermediaries and Markets," Center for Financial Institutions Working Papers 00-44, Wharton School Center for Financial Institutions, University of Pennsylvania.
  20. Alan D. Morrison & Lucy White, 2005. "Crises and Capital Requirements in Banking," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 95(5), pages 1548-1572, December.
  21. Kim, Daesik & Santomero, Anthony M, 1988. " Risk in Banking and Capital Regulation," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 43(5), pages 1219-33, December.
  22. Marc Klau & John Hawkins, 2000. "Measuring potential vulnerabilities in emerging market economies," BIS Working Papers 91, Bank for International Settlements.
  23. Kibritcioglu, Aykut, 2002. "Excessive Risk-Taking, Banking Sector Fragility, and Banking Crises," Working Papers 02-0114, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, College of Business.
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