IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/
MyIDEAS: Login to save this article or follow this journal

Deposit insurance and subsidized recapitalizations

  • Morrison, Alan D.
  • White, Lucy
Registered author(s):

    The 2007–2009 financial crisis saw a vast expansion in deposit insurance guarantees around the world and yet our understanding of the design and consequences of deposit insurance schemes is in its infancy. We provide a new rationale for the provision of deposit insurance. In our model the banking sector exhibits both adverse selection and moral hazard, which implies that the social benefits of bank monitoring must for incentive reasons be shared between depositors and banks. Consequently, socially too few deposits are made in equilibrium. Deposit insurance – or, equivalently, bank recapitalization – corrects this market failure. We find that deposit insurance should be funded not by banks or depositors but out of general taxation. The optimal level of deposit insurance varies inversely with the quality of the banking system. Hence, when the soundness of the financial sector is uncertain, governments should consider supporting deposit insurance schemes and undertaking subsidized recapitalizations.

    If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

    File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0378426611001841
    Download Restriction: Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.

    Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of Banking & Finance.

    Volume (Year): 35 (2011)
    Issue (Month): 12 ()
    Pages: 3400-3416

    as
    in new window

    Handle: RePEc:eee:jbfina:v:35:y:2011:i:12:p:3400-3416
    Contact details of provider: Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/jbf

    References listed on IDEAS
    Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

    as in new window
    1. Franklin Allen & Elena Carletti & Robert Marquez, 2009. "Credit Market Competition and Capital Regulation," Economics Working Papers ECO2009/08, European University Institute.
    2. Douglas W. Diamond & Raghuram G. Rajan, 2009. "Illiquidity and Interest Rate Policy," NBER Working Papers 15197, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    3. Diamond, Douglas W, 1984. "Financial Intermediation and Delegated Monitoring," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 51(3), pages 393-414, July.
    4. Holmström, Bengt & Tirole, Jean, 1994. "Financial Intermediation, Loanable Funds and the Real Sector," IDEI Working Papers 40, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse.
    5. Diamond, Douglas W & Dybvig, Philip H, 1983. "Bank Runs, Deposit Insurance, and Liquidity," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 91(3), pages 401-19, June.
    6. Jean-Charles Rochet & Jean Tirole, 1996. "Interbank lending and systemic risk," Proceedings, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.), pages 733-765.
    7. Matutes, Carmen & Vives, Xavier, 1996. "Competition for Deposits, Fragility, and Insurance," Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, vol. 5(2), pages 184-216, April.
    8. Yuk-Shee Chan & Stuart I. Greenbaum & Anjan V. Thakor, 2004. "Is Fairly Priced Deposit Insurance Possible?," Finance 0411018, EconWPA.
    9. Bhattacharya, Sudipto, 1982. " Aspects of Monetary and Banking Theory and Moral Hazard," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 37(2), pages 371-84, May.
    10. Kevin C. Murdock & Thomas F. Hellmann & Joseph E. Stiglitz, 2000. "Liberalization, Moral Hazard in Banking, and Prudential Regulation: Are Capital Requirements Enough?," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 90(1), pages 147-165, March.
    11. Nagarajan, S. & Sealey, C. W., 1995. "Forbearance, deposit insurance pricing, and incentive compatible bank regulation," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 19(6), pages 1109-1130, September.
    12. De Giuli, Maria Elena & Maggi, Mario Alessandro & Paris, Francesco Maria, 2009. "Deposit guarantee evaluation and incentives analysis in a mutual guarantee system," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 33(6), pages 1058-1068, June.
    13. Demirguc-Kunt, Asli & Detragiache, Enrica, 1999. "Does deposit insurance increase banking system stability ? An empirical investigation," Policy Research Working Paper Series 2247, The World Bank.
    14. Cordella, Tito & Levy Yeyati, Eduardo, 1998. "Financial Opening, Deposit Insurance and Risk in a Model of Banking Competition," CEPR Discussion Papers 1939, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    15. Freixas, Xavier & Rochet, Jean-Charles, 1998. "Fair pricing of deposit insurance. Is it possible? Yes. Is it desirable? No," Research in Economics, Elsevier, vol. 52(3), pages 217-232, September.
    16. Thomas Cargill, 2002. "Japan passes again on fundamental financial reform," FRBSF Economic Letter, Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco, issue sep27.
    17. Fonseca, Ana Rosa & González, Francisco, 2010. "How bank capital buffers vary across countries: The influence of cost of deposits, market power and bank regulation," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 34(4), pages 892-902, April.
    18. Acharya, Viral V, 2002. "Is the International Convergence of Capital Adequacy Regulation Desirable?," CEPR Discussion Papers 3253, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    19. Adam B. Ashcraft, 2003. "Are banks really special? New evidence from the FDIC-induced failure of healthy banks," Staff Reports 176, Federal Reserve Bank of New York.
    20. Calomiris, Charles W. & Schweikart, Larry, 1991. "The Panic of 1857: Origins, Transmission, and Containment," The Journal of Economic History, Cambridge University Press, vol. 51(04), pages 807-834, December.
    21. Merton, Robert C., 1977. "On the cost of deposit insurance when there are surveillance costs," Working papers 903-77., Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Sloan School of Management.
    22. Barth, James R. & Caprio Jr., Gerard & Levine, Ross, 2001. "Bank regulation and supervision : what works best?," Policy Research Working Paper Series 2725, The World Bank.
    23. Xavier Freixas & Jean-Charles Rochet, 1997. "Microeconomics of Banking," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262061937, June.
    24. Asli Demirguc-Kunt & Edward J. Kane, 2002. "Deposit Insurance Around the Globe: Where Does It Work?," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 16(2), pages 175-195, Spring.
    25. Wheelock, David C & Kumbhakar, Subal C, 1995. "Which Banks Choose Deposit Insurance? Evidence of Adverse Selection and Moral Hazard in a Voluntary Insurance System," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 27(1), pages 186-201, February.
    26. Calomiris, Charles W., 1990. "Is Deposit Insurance Necessary? A Historical Perspective," The Journal of Economic History, Cambridge University Press, vol. 50(02), pages 283-295, June.
    27. Demirguc-Kunt, Asli & Karacaovali, Baybars & Laeven, Luc, 2005. "Deposit insurance around the world : a comprehensive database," Policy Research Working Paper Series 3628, The World Bank.
    28. Morrison, Alan & White, Lucy, 2004. "Crises and Capital Requirements in Banking," CEPR Discussion Papers 4364, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    29. Edward J. Kane, 1989. "How Incentive-Incompatible Deposit-Insurance Funds Fail," NBER Working Papers 2836, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    30. Andries, Natalia & Billon, Steve, 2010. "The effect of bank ownership and deposit insurance on monetary policy transmission," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 34(12), pages 3050-3054, December.
    31. Alan D. Morrison & Lucy White, 2005. "Crises and Capital Requirements in Banking," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 95(5), pages 1548-1572, December.
    32. Park, Sangkyun, 1996. "Banking and Deposit Insurance as a Risk Transfer Mechanism," Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, vol. 5(3), pages 284-304, July.
    33. Hwang, Dar-Yeh & Shie, Fu-Shuen & Wang, Kehluh & Lin, Jung-Chu, 2009. "The pricing of deposit insurance considering bankruptcy costs and closure policies," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 33(10), pages 1909-1919, October.
    34. Hyun Song Shin, 2009. "Reflections on Northern Rock: The Bank Run That Heralded the Global Financial Crisis," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 23(1), pages 101-19, Winter.
    35. Keeley, Michael C, 1990. "Deposit Insurance, Risk, and Market Power in Banking," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 80(5), pages 1183-1200, December.
    36. Martin F. Hellwig, 2001. "symposium articles: Risk aversion and incentive compatibility with ex post information asymmetry," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 18(2), pages 415-438.
    37. James, Christopher, 1987. "Some evidence on the uniqueness of bank loans," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 19(2), pages 217-235, December.
    38. Kim, Daesik & Santomero, Anthony M, 1988. " Risk in Banking and Capital Regulation," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 43(5), pages 1219-33, December.
    39. Merton, Robert C., 1977. "An analytic derivation of the cost of deposit insurance and loan guarantees An application of modern option pricing theory," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 1(1), pages 3-11, June.
    40. Demirguc-Kunt, Asli & Huizinga, Harry, 2004. "Market discipline and deposit insurance," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 51(2), pages 375-399, March.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

    When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:jbfina:v:35:y:2011:i:12:p:3400-3416. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Zhang, Lei)

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

    If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis using RePEc data.