IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/eee/jfinin/v53y2023ics1042957322000493.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Inefficient liquidity creation

Author

Listed:
  • Luck, Stephan
  • Schempp, Paul

Abstract

We present a model in which intermediaries create liquidity by issuing safe debt. Two types of intermediaries emerge: Traditional banks that create liquidity by issuing equity and holding assets to maturity, and market-based intermediaries that create liquidity by selling assets in fire sales in downturns. We show that the reliance on market-based intermediation is necessarily too high, but liquidity creation is not. It can also be too low as the endogenous fire-sale risk can push liquidity creation below its optimum. We argue that standard capital or liquidity regulation are ineffective, and optimal macroprudential regulation should instead target market-based intermediation.

Suggested Citation

  • Luck, Stephan & Schempp, Paul, 2023. "Inefficient liquidity creation," Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, vol. 53(C).
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:jfinin:v:53:y:2023:i:c:s1042957322000493
    DOI: 10.1016/j.jfi.2022.100996
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1042957322000493
    Download Restriction: Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1016/j.jfi.2022.100996?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Jeremy C. Stein, 2012. "Monetary Policy as Financial Stability Regulation," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 127(1), pages 57-95.
    2. Nicola Cetorelli & Benjamin H. Mandel & Lindsay Mollineaux, 2012. "The evolution of banks and financial intermediation: framing the analysis," Economic Policy Review, Federal Reserve Bank of New York, vol. 18(Jul), pages 1-12.
    3. Hans Gersbach & Jean-Charles Rochet, 2012. "Aggregate Investment Externalities and Macroprudential Regulation," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 44, pages 73-109, December.
    4. Mr. Anil Ari & Matthieu Darracq-Paries & Christoffer Kok, 2017. "Shadow Banking and Market Discipline on Traditional Banks," IMF Working Papers 2017/285, International Monetary Fund.
    5. Bengt Holmstrom & Jean Tirole, 1998. "Private and Public Supply of Liquidity," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 106(1), pages 1-40, February.
    6. Hanson, Samuel G. & Shleifer, Andrei & Stein, Jeremy C. & Vishny, Robert W., 2015. "Banks as patient fixed-income investors," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 117(3), pages 449-469.
    7. Chretien, Edouard & Lyonnet, Victor, 2019. "Traditional and Shadow Banks," Working Paper Series 2019-11, Ohio State University, Charles A. Dice Center for Research in Financial Economics.
    8. Douglas W. Diamond & Philip H. Dybvig, 2000. "Bank runs, deposit insurance, and liquidity," Quarterly Review, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis, vol. 24(Win), pages 14-23.
    9. Acharya, Viral V. & Schnabl, Philipp & Suarez, Gustavo, 2013. "Securitization without risk transfer," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 107(3), pages 515-536.
    10. Douglas Gale & Piero Gottardi, 2015. "Capital Structure, Investment, and Fire Sales," The Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 28(9), pages 2502-2533.
    11. Guillaume Plantin, 2015. "Shadow Banking and Bank Capital Regulation," The Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 28(1), pages 146-175.
    12. Eduardo Dávila & Anton Korinek, 2018. "Pecuniary Externalities in Economies with Financial Frictions," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 85(1), pages 352-395.
    13. Guido Lorenzoni, 2008. "Inefficient Credit Booms," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 75(3), pages 809-833.
    14. Parlatore, Cecilia, 2016. "Fragility in money market funds: Sponsor support and regulation," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 121(3), pages 595-623.
    15. Gersbach, Hans & Rochet, Jean-Charles, 2017. "Capital regulation and credit fluctuations," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 90(C), pages 113-124.
    16. Gary Gorton & Andrew Metrick, 2012. "Getting Up to Speed on the Financial Crisis: A One-Weekend-Reader's Guide," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 50(1), pages 128-150, March.
    17. Javier Bianchi & Enrique G. Mendoza, 2018. "Optimal Time-Consistent Macroprudential Policy," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 126(2), pages 588-634.
    18. Buchak, Greg & Matvos, Gregor & Piskorski, Tomasz & Seru, Amit, 2018. "Fintech, regulatory arbitrage, and the rise of shadow banks," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 130(3), pages 453-483.
    19. Frederic Malherbe, 2020. "Optimal Capital Requirements over the Business and Financial Cycles," American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 12(3), pages 139-174, July.
    20. Morrison, Alan D. & White, Lucy, 2011. "Deposit insurance and subsidized recapitalizations," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 35(12), pages 3400-3416.
    21. Gorton, Gary & Pennacchi, George, 1990. "Financial Intermediaries and Liquidity Creation," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 45(1), pages 49-71, March.
    22. Allen, Franklin & Gale, Douglas, 1994. "Limited Market Participation and Volatility of Asset Prices," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 84(4), pages 933-955, September.
    23. Nicola Cetorelli, 2012. "Introducing a Series on the Evolution of Banks and Financial Intermediation," Liberty Street Economics 20120716, Federal Reserve Bank of New York.
    24. Huang, Ji, 2018. "Banking and shadow banking," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 178(C), pages 124-152.
    25. Holmström, Bengt, 2013. "Inside and Outside Liquidity," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262518536, April.
    26. An, Ping & Yu, Mengxuan, 2018. "Neglected part of shadow banking in China," International Review of Economics & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 57(C), pages 211-236.
    27. Guillaume Plantin, 2015. "Shadow Banking and Bank Capital Regulation," SciencePo Working papers Main hal-01168494, HAL.
    28. Tri Vi Dang & Gary Gorton & Bengt Holmström & Guillermo Ordoñez, 2017. "Banks as Secret Keepers," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 107(4), pages 1005-1029, April.
    29. Gorton, Gary B., 2010. "Slapped by the Invisible Hand: The Panic of 2007," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, number 9780199734153.
    30. Guillaume Plantin, 2015. "Shadow Banking and Bank Capital Regulation," SciencePo Working papers hal-01168494, HAL.
    31. Gazi I Kara & S Mehmet Ozsoy & Itay Goldstein, 2020. "Bank Regulation under Fire Sale Externalities," The Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 33(6), pages 2554-2584.
    32. Anat Admati & Martin Hellwig, 2013. "The Bankers' New Clothes: What's Wrong with Banking and What to Do about It," Economics Books, Princeton University Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 9929.
    33. Ansgar Walther, 2016. "Jointly Optimal Regulation of Bank Capital and Liquidity," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 48(2-3), pages 415-448, March.
    34. repec:hal:spmain:info:hdl:2441/hqvfahst79ekpe0losvq1h46k is not listed on IDEAS
    35. Gary Gorton & Andrew Metrick, 2010. "Regulating the Shadow Banking System," Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Economic Studies Program, The Brookings Institution, vol. 41(2 (Fall)), pages 261-312.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Clayton, Christopher & Schaab, Andreas, 2023. "Regulation with Externalities and Misallocation in General Equilibrium," TSE Working Papers 23-1445, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE).
    2. Eduardo Dávila & Ansgar Walther, 2021. "Corrective Regulation with Imperfect Instruments," NBER Working Papers 29160, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    3. DeAngelo, Harry & Stulz, René M., 2015. "Liquid-claim production, risk management, and bank capital structure: Why high leverage is optimal for banks," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 116(2), pages 219-236.
    4. Douglas Gale & Tanju Yorulmazer, 2020. "Bank capital, fire sales, and the social value of deposits," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 69(4), pages 919-963, June.
    5. Emmanuel Farhi & Jean Tirole, 2021. "Shadow Banking and the Four Pillars of Traditional Financial Intermediation [Securitization without Risk Transfer]," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 88(6), pages 2622-2653.
    6. Wei, Xin & Liu, Xi & Zhang, Xueyong, 2022. "Shadow banking and the cross-section of stock returns," Journal of International Financial Markets, Institutions and Money, Elsevier, vol. 81(C).
    7. Robin Dottling, 2018. "Bank Capital Regulation in a Zero Interest Environment," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 18-016/IV, Tinbergen Institute, revised 11 Oct 2019.
    8. Christoph Bertsch & Mike Mariathasan, 2021. "Optimal bank leverage and recapitalization in crowded markets," BIS Working Papers 923, Bank for International Settlements.
    9. Bengui, Julien & Bianchi, Javier, 2022. "Macroprudential policy with leakages," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 139(C).
    10. Hasman, Augusto & Samartín, Margarita, 2022. "Leaving the darkness: The emergence of shadow banks," Journal of Financial Stability, Elsevier, vol. 61(C).
    11. Krishnamurthy, Arvind & Vissing-Jorgensen, Annette, 2015. "The impact of Treasury supply on financial sector lending and stability," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 118(3), pages 571-600.
    12. Matthieu Darracq Paries, 2018. "Financial frictions and monetary policy conduct," Erudite Ph.D Dissertations, Erudite, number ph18-01 edited by Ferhat Mihoubi.
    13. Xiang, Haotian, 2022. "Corporate debt choice and bank capital regulation," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 144(C).
    14. Borys Grochulski & Yuzhe Zhang, 2015. "Optimal Liquidity Regulation With Shadow Banking," Working Paper 15-12, Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond.
    15. Borys Grochulski & Yuzhe Zhang, 2019. "Optimal liquidity policy with shadow banking," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 68(4), pages 967-1015, November.
    16. Greg Buchak & Gregor Matvos & Tomasz Piskorski & Amit Seru, 2024. "Aggregate Lending and Modern Financial Intermediation: Why Bank Balance Sheet Models Are Miscalibrated," NBER Macroeconomics Annual, University of Chicago Press, vol. 38(1), pages 239-287.
    17. Kreamer, Jonathan, 2022. "Financial intermediation and the supply of liquidity," Journal of Financial Stability, Elsevier, vol. 61(C).
    18. Brunnermeier, Markus K. & Oehmke, Martin, 2013. "Bubbles, Financial Crises, and Systemic Risk," Handbook of the Economics of Finance, in: G.M. Constantinides & M. Harris & R. M. Stulz (ed.), Handbook of the Economics of Finance, volume 2, chapter 0, pages 1221-1288, Elsevier.
    19. Gertler, M. & Kiyotaki, N. & Prestipino, A., 2016. "Wholesale Banking and Bank Runs in Macroeconomic Modeling of Financial Crises," Handbook of Macroeconomics, in: J. B. Taylor & Harald Uhlig (ed.), Handbook of Macroeconomics, edition 1, volume 2, chapter 0, pages 1345-1425, Elsevier.
    20. Feng Min & Fenghua Wen & Jiayu Xu & Nan Wu, 2023. "Credit supply, house prices, and financial stability," International Journal of Finance & Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 28(2), pages 2088-2108, April.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Banking; Macroprudential regulation; Liquidity creation; Fire sales; Pecuniary externalities; Shadow banking; Regulatory arbitrage;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • G21 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages
    • G23 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Non-bank Financial Institutions; Financial Instruments; Institutional Investors
    • G28 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Government Policy and Regulation

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:jfinin:v:53:y:2023:i:c:s1042957322000493. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Catherine Liu (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/622875 .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.