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Shadow Banking and Bank Capital Regulation

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  • Guillaume Plantin

    (ECON - Département d'économie (Sciences Po) - Sciences Po - Sciences Po - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique)

Abstract

Banks are subject to capital requirements because their privately optimal leverage is higher than the socially optimal one. This is in turn because banks fail to internalize all costs that their insolvency creates for agents who use their money-like liabilities to settle transactions. If banks can bypass capital regulation in an opaque shadow banking sector, it may be optimal to relax capital requirements so that liquidity dries up in the shadow banking sector. Tightening capital requirements may spur a surge in shadow banking activity that leads to an overall larger risk on the money-like liabilities of the formal and shadow banking institutions.

Suggested Citation

  • Guillaume Plantin, 2015. "Shadow Banking and Bank Capital Regulation," SciencePo Working papers Main hal-01168494, HAL.
    • Handle: RePEc:hal:spmain:hal-01168494
    DOI: 10.1093/rfs/hhu055
    Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://hal-sciencespo.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-01168494
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

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    3. Ji Huang & Zongbo Huang & Xiang Shao, 2023. "The Risk of Implicit Guarantees: Evidence from Shadow Banks in China," Review of Finance, European Finance Association, vol. 27(4), pages 1521-1544.
    4. Wei, Xin & Liu, Xi & Zhang, Xueyong, 2022. "Shadow banking and the cross-section of stock returns," Journal of International Financial Markets, Institutions and Money, Elsevier, vol. 81(C).
    5. Greg Buchak & Gregor Matvos & Tomasz Piskorski & Amit Seru, 2023. "Aggregate Lending and Modern Financial Intermediation: Why Bank Balance Sheet Models Are Miscalibrated," NBER Chapters, in: NBER Macroeconomics Annual 2023, volume 38, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    6. Maxime Delabarre, 2021. "FinTech in the Financial Market," SciencePo Working papers Main hal-03107769, HAL.
    7. Eccles, Peter & Grout, Paul & Zalewska, Anna & Siciliani, Paolo, 2023. "Open banking, shadow banking and regulation," Bank of England working papers 1039, Bank of England.
    8. Dwyer, Gerald P. & Hasman, Augusto & Samartín, Margarita, 2022. "Surety bonds and moral hazard in banking," Journal of Financial Stability, Elsevier, vol. 62(C).
    9. Luck, Stephan & Schempp, Paul, 2023. "Inefficient liquidity creation," Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, vol. 53(C).
    10. Haselmann, Rainer & Singla, Shikhar & Vig, Vikrant, 2022. "Supranational supervision," LawFin Working Paper Series 50, Goethe University, Center for Advanced Studies on the Foundations of Law and Finance (LawFin).
    11. Xiang, Haotian, 2022. "Corporate debt choice and bank capital regulation," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 144(C).
    12. Bengui, Julien & Bianchi, Javier, 2022. "Macroprudential policy with leakages," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 139(C).
    13. Viral Acharya & Guillaume Plantin, 2019. "Monetary Easing, Investment and Financial Instability," SciencePo Working papers Main hal-03393106, HAL.
    14. Haselmann, Rainer & Singla, Shikhar & Vig, Vikrant, 2022. "Supranational supervision," LawFin Working Paper Series 46, Goethe University, Center for Advanced Studies on the Foundations of Law and Finance (LawFin).
    15. Retselisitsoe I. Thamae & Nicholas M. Odhiambo, 2022. "The impact of bank regulation on bank lending: a review of international literature," Journal of Banking Regulation, Palgrave Macmillan, vol. 23(4), pages 405-418, December.
    16. Michael S. Barr, 2022. "Why Bank Capital Matters: At the American Enterprise Institute, Washington, D.C. (virtual) December 1st 2022," Speech 95822, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.).
    17. Nielsen, Carsten Krabbe & Weinrich, Gerd, 2023. "Bank regulation and market structure," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 88(C).
    18. Han, Xun & Aibai, Abuduwali & Xie, Xinyan, 2023. "Fiscal decentralization and shadow banking activities of non-financial enterprises," Finance Research Letters, Elsevier, vol. 54(C).
    19. Haselmann, Rainer & Kick, Thomas & Singla, Shikhar & Vig, Vikrant, 2022. "Capital regulation, market-making, and liquidity," LawFin Working Paper Series 44, Goethe University, Center for Advanced Studies on the Foundations of Law and Finance (LawFin).
    20. Viral V Acharya & Guillaume Plantin, 2019. "Monetary Easing, Leveraged Payouts and Lack of Investment," SciencePo Working papers Main hal-03792101, HAL.
    21. Guillaume Plantin & Viral Acharya, 2018. "Monetary Easing, Investment and Financial Instability," SciencePo Working papers Main hal-03393126, HAL.

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