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Sustainable Shadow Banking

Author

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  • Guillermo Ordonez

Abstract

Commercial banks are subject to regulation that restricts their investments. When banks are concerned for their reputation, however, they could self-regulate and invest more efficiently. Hence, a shadow banking that arises to avoid regulation has the potential to improve welfare. Still, reputation concerns depend on future economic prospects and may suddenly disappear, generating a collapse of shadow banking and a return to traditional banking, with a decline in welfare. I discuss how a combination of traditional regulation and cross reputation subsidization may enhance shadow banking and make it more sustainable.

Suggested Citation

  • Guillermo Ordonez, 2013. "Sustainable Shadow Banking," NBER Working Papers 19022, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  • Handle: RePEc:nbr:nberwo:19022
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    File URL: http://www.nber.org/papers/w19022.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Nicola Gennaioli & Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, 2013. "A Model of Shadow Banking," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 68(4), pages 1331-1363, August.
    2. Ordoñez, Guillermo L., 2013. "Fragility of reputation and clustering of risk-taking," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 8(3), September.
    3. Pozsar, Zoltan & Adrian, Tobias & Ashcraft, Adam B. & Boesky, Hayley, 2013. "Shadow banking," Economic Policy Review, Federal Reserve Bank of New York, issue Dec, pages 1-16.
      • Zoltan Pozsar & Tobias Adrian & Adam B. Ashcraft & Hayley Boesky, 2010. "Shadow banking," Staff Reports 458, Federal Reserve Bank of New York.
    4. Andrew Atkeson & Christian Hellwig & Guillermo Ordoñez, 2015. "Optimal Regulation in the Presence of Reputation Concerns," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 130(1), pages 415-464.
    5. repec:prs:recofi:ecofi_0987-3368_2012_num_105_1_5969 is not listed on IDEAS
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Luck, Stephan & Schempp, Paul, 2014. "Banks, shadow banking, and fragility," Working Paper Series 1726, European Central Bank.
    2. Jess Benhabib & Jianjun Miao & Pengfei Wang, 2016. "Chaotic banking crises and regulations," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 61(2), pages 393-422, February.
    3. E. Chrétien & V. Lyonnet, 2017. "Traditional and Shadow Banks during the Crisis," Débats économiques et financiers 27, Banque de France.
    4. Calimani, Susanna & Hałaj, Grzegorz & Żochowski, Dawid, 2017. "Simulating fire-sales in a banking and shadow banking system," ESRB Working Paper Series 46, European Systemic Risk Board.
    5. Grochulski, Borys & Zhang, Yuzhe, 2015. "Optimal Liquidity Regulation With Shadow Banking," Working Paper 15-12, Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond, revised 15 Oct 2015.
    6. Guillaume Plantin, 2015. "Shadow Banking and Bank Capital Regulation," Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 28(1), pages 146-175.
    7. Guillaume Plantin, 2015. "Shadow Banking and Bank Capital Regulation," Post-Print hal-01168494, HAL.
    8. Ferrante, Francesco, 2015. "A Model of Endogenous Loan Quality and the Collapse of the Shadow Banking System," Finance and Economics Discussion Series 2015-21, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.).
    9. Flore, Raphael, 2015. "Causes of Shadow Banking - Two Regimes of Credit Risk Transformation and its Regulation," Annual Conference 2015 (Muenster): Economic Development - Theory and Policy 113178, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
    10. Li, Xuelian & Lin, Jyh-Horng, 2016. "Shadow-banking entrusted loan management, deposit insurance premium, and capital regulation," International Review of Economics & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 41(C), pages 98-109.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • E44 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Money and Interest Rates - - - Financial Markets and the Macroeconomy
    • G01 - Financial Economics - - General - - - Financial Crises
    • G18 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - Government Policy and Regulation
    • G21 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages

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