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Optimal Regulation in the Presence of Reputation Concerns

  • Guillermo Ordonez

    (Minneapolis Fed and Yale University.)

  • Andrew Atkeson

    (UCLA and Minneapolis Fed.)

and strong reputation concerns.

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File URL: https://www.economicdynamics.org/meetpapers/2009/paper_830.pdf
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Paper provided by Society for Economic Dynamics in its series 2009 Meeting Papers with number 830.

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Date of creation: 2009
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:red:sed009:830
Contact details of provider: Postal:
Society for Economic Dynamics Marina Azzimonti Department of Economics Stonybrook University 10 Nicolls Road Stonybrook NY 11790 USA

Web page: http://www.EconomicDynamics.org/
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  1. Arnott, Richard & Greenwald, Bruce & Stiglitz, Joseph E., 1994. "Information and economic efficiency," Information Economics and Policy, Elsevier, vol. 6(1), pages 77-82, March.
  2. Mailath,G.J. & Samuelson,L., 1998. "Who wants a good reputation?," Working papers 19, Wisconsin Madison - Social Systems.
  3. Johannes H�rner, 2002. "Reputation and Competition," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 92(3), pages 644-663, June.
  4. George A. Akerlof, 1970. "The Market for "Lemons": Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 84(3), pages 488-500.
  5. Moritz Meyer-ter-Vehn & Simon Board, 2009. "Reputation for Quality," 2009 Meeting Papers 160, Society for Economic Dynamics.
  6. Avner Shared & John Sutton, 1981. "The Self-Regulating Profession," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 48(2), pages 217-234.
  7. Walter Garcia-Fontes & Hugo Hopenhayn, 2000. "Entry restrictions and the determination of quality," Spanish Economic Review, Springer, vol. 2(2), pages 105-127.
  8. Prescott, Edward C & Townsend, Robert M, 1984. "Pareto Optima and Competitive Equilibria with Adverse Selection and Moral Hazard," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 52(1), pages 21-45, January.
  9. Biglaiser, Gary & Friedman, James W., 1994. "Middlemen as guarantors of quality," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 12(4), pages 509-531, December.
  10. Howard P. Marvel & Stephen McCafferty, 1984. "Resale Price Maintenance and Quality Certification," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 15(3), pages 346-359, Autumn.
  11. repec:oup:restud:v:68:y:2001:i:2:p:415-41 is not listed on IDEAS
  12. Alessandro Lizzeri, 1999. "Information Revelation and Certification Intermediaries," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 30(2), pages 214-231, Summer.
  13. Carl Shapiro, 1983. "Premiums for High Quality Products as Returns to Reputations," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 98(4), pages 659-679.
  14. Julien Prat & Carlos Alos-Ferrer, 2007. "Job Market Signaling and Employer Learning," 2007 Meeting Papers 648, Society for Economic Dynamics.
  15. repec:oup:restud:v:48:y:1981:i:2:p:217-34 is not listed on IDEAS
  16. Erzo G. J. Luttmer, 2007. "Selection, Growth, and the Size Distribution of Firms," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 122(3), pages 1103-1144.
  17. Maksimovic, Vojislav & Titman, Sheridan, 1991. "Financial Policy and Reputation for Product Quality," Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 4(1), pages 175-200.
  18. repec:oup:restud:v:68:y:2001:i:3:p:714 is not listed on IDEAS
  19. W. Bentley MacLeod, 2007. "Reputations, Relationships, and Contract Enforcement," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 45(3), pages 595-628, September.
  20. Heski Bar-Isaac, 2003. "Reputation and Survival: Learning in a Dynamic Signalling Model," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 70(2), pages 231-251.
  21. Steven Tadelis, 1999. "What's in a Name? Reputation as a Tradeable Asset," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 89(3), pages 548-563, June.
  22. Arilton Teixeira & Berthold Herrendorf, 2009. "Barriers to Entry and Development," Fucape Working Papers 22, Fucape Business School.
  23. Hopenhayn, Hugo A, 1992. "Entry, Exit, and Firm Dynamics in Long Run Equilibrium," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 60(5), pages 1127-50, September.
  24. Klein, Benjamin & Leffler, Keith B, 1981. "The Role of Market Forces in Assuring Contractual Performance," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 89(4), pages 615-41, August.
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