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Job Market Signaling and Employer Learning

Author Info

Listed author(s):
  • Alós-Ferrer, Carlos

    ()

    (University of Konstanz)

  • Prat, Julien

    ()

    (CREST)

Abstract

This paper extends the job market signaling model of Spence (1973) by allowing firms to learn the ability of their employees over time. Contrary to the model without employer learning, we find that the Intuitive Criterion does not always select a unique separating equilibrium. When the Intuitive Criterion bites and information is purely asymmetric, the separating level of education does not depend on the observability of workers’ types. On the other hand, when workers are also uncertain about their productivity, the separating level of education is ambiguously related to the speed of employer learning.

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File URL: http://ftp.iza.org/dp3285.pdf
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Paper provided by Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) in its series IZA Discussion Papers with number 3285.

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Length: 31 pages
Date of creation: Jan 2008
Publication status: published online in: Journal of Economic Theory, 2012, [In Press / Corrected Proof]
Handle: RePEc:iza:izadps:dp3285
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Keywords: education; job markets; signaling; intuitive criterion; employer learning;

Other versions of this item:

Find related papers by JEL classification:
  • I20 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Education - - - General
  • C70 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - General
  • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
  • D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness

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  1. Gibbons, Robert & Katz, Lawrence F, 1991. "Layoffs and Lemons," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 9(4), pages 351-380, October.
  2. Alós-Ferrer, Carlos & Ritzberger, Klaus, 2008. "Trees and extensive forms," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 143(1), pages 216-250, November.
  3. Nick Feltovich & Richmond Harbaugh & Ted To, 2002. "Too Cool for School? Signalling and Countersignalling," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 33(4), pages 630-649, Winter.
  4. Joshua C. Pinkston, 2009. "A Model of Asymmetric Employer Learning with Testable Implications," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 76(1), pages 367-394.
  5. Mas-Colell, Andreu & Whinston, Michael D. & Green, Jerry R., 1995. "Microeconomic Theory," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, number 9780195102680.
  6. Henry S. Farber & Robert Gibbons, 1996. "Learning and Wage Dynamics," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 111(4), pages 1007-1047.
  7. Araujo, Aloisio & Moreira, Humberto, 2010. "Adverse selection problems without the Spence-Mirrlees condition," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 145(3), pages 1113-1141, May.
  8. In-Koo Cho & David M. Kreps, 1987. "Signaling Games and Stable Equilibria," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 102(2), pages 179-221.
  9. Wolpin, Kenneth I, 1977. "Education and Screening," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 67(5), pages 949-958, December.
  10. Cho, In-Koo & Sobel, Joel, 1990. "Strategic stability and uniqueness in signaling games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 50(2), pages 381-413, April.
  11. Joseph G. Altonji & Charles R. Pierret, 2001. "Employer Learning and Statistical Discrimination," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 116(1), pages 313-350.
  12. Banks, Jeffrey S & Sobel, Joel, 1987. "Equilibrium Selection in Signaling Games," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 55(3), pages 647-661, May.
  13. Kohlberg, Elon & Mertens, Jean-Francois, 1986. "On the Strategic Stability of Equilibria," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 54(5), pages 1003-1037, September.
  14. Fabian Lange, 2007. "The Speed of Employer Learning," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 25, pages 1-35.
  15. Mailath George J. & Okuno-Fujiwara Masahiro & Postlewaite Andrew, 1993. "Belief-Based Refinements in Signalling Games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 60(2), pages 241-276, August.
  16. Steffen Habermalz, 2011. "The speed of employer learning and job market signalling revisited," Applied Economics Letters, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 18(7), pages 607-610.
  17. Jovanovic, Boyan, 1979. "Job Matching and the Theory of Turnover," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 87(5), pages 972-990, October.
  18. Heski Bar-Isaac, 2003. "Reputation and Survival: Learning in a Dynamic Signalling Model," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 70(2), pages 231-251.
  19. Axel Anderson & Lones Smith, 2010. "Dynamic Matching and Evolving Reputations," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 77(1), pages 3-29.
  20. Robert Gibbons & Lawrence F. Katz & Thomas Lemieux & Daniel Parent, 2005. "Comparative Advantage, Learning, and Sectoral Wage Determination," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 23(4), pages 681-724, October.
  21. Péter Eső & James Schummer, 2009. "Credible deviations from signaling equilibria," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 38(3), pages 411-430, November.
  22. Mark Voorneveld & Jörgen W. Weibull, 2011. "A Scent of Lemon—Seller Meets Buyer with a Noisy Quality Observation," Games, MDPI, Open Access Journal, vol. 2(1), pages 1-24, March.
  23. Giuseppe Moscarini, 2005. "Job Matching and the Wage Distribution," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 73(2), pages 481-516, 03.
  24. Michael Spence, 1973. "Job Market Signaling," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 87(3), pages 355-374.
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Cited by:

  1. Luis Santos-Pinto, 2011. "Labor Market Signaling and Self-Confidence: Wage Compression and the Gender Pay Gap N.B.: This paper replaces Nr 10.07 "Labor Market Signaling with Overconfident Workers" (June 2010)," Cahiers de Recherches Economiques du Département d'Econométrie et d'Economie politique (DEEP) 11.07, Université de Lausanne, Faculté des HEC, DEEP.
  2. Mark Voorneveld & Jörgen W. Weibull, 2011. "A Scent of Lemon—Seller Meets Buyer with a Noisy Quality Observation," Games, MDPI, Open Access Journal, vol. 2(1), pages 1-24, March.
  3. Andrew Atkeson & Christian Hellwig & Guillermo Ordoñez, 2015. "Optimal Regulation in the Presence of Reputation Concerns," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 130(1), pages 415-464.
  4. Marcus Berliant & Chia-Ming Yu, 2015. "Locational Signaling And Agglomeration," Journal of Regional Science, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 55(5), pages 757-773, November.
  5. NAKABAYASHI, Masaki, 2011. "Acquired Skills and Learned Abilities: Wage Dynamics of Blue-collar Workers in Internal Labor Markets," ISS Discussion Paper Series (series F) f153, Institute of Social Science, The University of Tokyo, revised Apr 2012.
  6. Luís Santos-Pinto, 2012. "Labor Market Signaling and Self-Confidence: Wage Compression and the Gender Pay Gap," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 30(4), pages 873-914.
  7. Daley, Brendan & Green, Brett, 2014. "Market signaling with grades," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 151(C), pages 114-145.

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