Job Market Signaling and Employer Learning
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- Alós-Ferrer, Carlos & Prat, Julien, 2012. "Job market signaling and employer learning," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 147(5), pages 1787-1817.
- Julien Prat & Carlos Alos-Ferrer, 2007. "Job Market Signaling and Employer Learning," 2007 Meeting Papers 648, Society for Economic Dynamics.
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More about this item
Keywords
education; job markets; signaling; intuitive criterion; employer learning;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- I20 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Education - - - General
- C70 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - General
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
NEP fields
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:- NEP-EDU-2008-02-02 (Education)
- NEP-HRM-2008-02-02 (Human Capital and Human Resource Management)
- NEP-LAB-2008-02-02 (Labour Economics)
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