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Trees and Extensive Forms

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Abstract

This paper addresses the question of what it takes to obtain a well-defined extensive form game. Without relying on simplifying finiteness or discreteness assumptions, we characterize the class of game trees for which (a) extensive forms can be defined and (b) all pure strategy combinations induce unique outcomes. The generality of the set-up covers “exotic” cases, like stochastic games or decision problems in continuous time (differential games). We find that the latter class fulfills the first, but not the second requirement.

Suggested Citation

  • Carlos Alós-Ferrer & Klaus Ritzberger, 2005. "Trees and Extensive Forms," Vienna Economics Papers vie0506, University of Vienna, Department of Economics.
    • Handle: RePEc:vie:viennp:vie0506
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    Cited by:

    1. Staudigl, Mathias & Steg, Jan-Henrik, 2014. "On Repeated Games with Imperfect Public Monitoring: From Discrete to Continuous Time," Center for Mathematical Economics Working Papers 525, Center for Mathematical Economics, Bielefeld University.
    2. Mackenzie, Andrew, 2020. "A revelation principle for obviously strategy-proof implementation," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 124(C), pages 512-533.
    3. J. Jude Kline & Shravan Luckraz, 2016. "Equivalence between graph-based and sequence-based extensive form games," Economic Theory Bulletin, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 4(1), pages 85-94, April.
    4. Attila Ambrus & Shih En Lu, 2015. "A Continuous-Time Model of Multilateral Bargaining," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 7(1), pages 208-249, February.
    5. Steg, Jan-Henrik, 2018. "Preemptive investment under uncertainty," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 110(C), pages 90-119.
    6. Niko Jaakkola & Florian Wagener, 2020. "All symmetric equilibria in differential games with public goods," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 20-020/II, Tinbergen Institute.
    7. Carlos Alós-Ferrer & Klaus Ritzberger, 2017. "Characterizing existence of equilibrium for large extensive form games: a necessity result," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 63(2), pages 407-430, February.
    8. Alós-Ferrer, Carlos & Ritzberger, Klaus, 2017. "Does backwards induction imply subgame perfection?," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 103(C), pages 19-29.
    9. Carlos Alós-Ferrer & Klaus Ritzberger, 2017. "Characterizations of perfect recall," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 46(2), pages 311-326, May.
    10. Alós-Ferrer, Carlos & Ritzberger, Klaus, 2016. "Equilibrium existence for large perfect information games," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 62(C), pages 5-18.
    11. Jan-Henrik Steg, 2018. "On Preemption in Discrete and Continuous Time," Dynamic Games and Applications, Springer, vol. 8(4), pages 918-938, December.
    12. Shravan Luckraz, 2019. "A Survey on the Relationship Between the Game of Cops and Robbers and Other Game Representations," Dynamic Games and Applications, Springer, vol. 9(2), pages 506-520, June.
    13. Riedel, Frank & Steg, Jan-Henrik, 2017. "Subgame-perfect equilibria in stochastic timing games," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 72(C), pages 36-50.
    14. Battigalli, Pierpaolo & Generoso, Nicolò, 2024. "Information flows and memory in games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 145(C), pages 356-376.
    15. Santiago R. Balseiro & Omar Besbes & Gabriel Y. Weintraub, 2019. "Dynamic Mechanism Design with Budget-Constrained Buyers Under Limited Commitment," Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 67(3), pages 711-730, May.
    16. Carlos Alós-Ferrer & Klaus Ritzberger, 2013. "Large extensive form games," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 52(1), pages 75-102, January.
    17. Julio González-Díaz & Miguel Meléndez-Jiménez, 2014. "On the notion of perfect Bayesian equilibrium," TOP: An Official Journal of the Spanish Society of Statistics and Operations Research, Springer;Sociedad de Estadística e Investigación Operativa, vol. 22(1), pages 128-143, April.
    18. Alós-Ferrer, Carlos & Prat, Julien, 2012. "Job market signaling and employer learning," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 147(5), pages 1787-1817.
    19. Alós-Ferrer, Carlos & Kern, Johannes, 2015. "Repeated games in continuous time as extensive form games," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 61(C), pages 34-57.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • D70 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - General

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