Test design under voluntary participation
Author
Abstract
Suggested Citation
DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2017.06.002
Download full text from publisher
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.
References listed on IDEAS
- Masahiro Okuno-Fujiwara & Andrew Postlewaite & Kotaro Suzumura, 1990. "Strategic Information Revelation," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 57(1), pages 25-47.
- Kolotilin, Anton, 2015.
"Experimental design to persuade,"
Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 90(C), pages 215-226.
- Anton Kolotilin, 2013. "Experimental Design to Persuade," Discussion Papers 2013-17, School of Economics, The University of New South Wales.
- Kimball, Miles S, 1990.
"Precautionary Saving in the Small and in the Large,"
Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 58(1), pages 53-73, January.
- Miles S. Kimball, 1989. "Precautionary Saving in the Small and in the Large," NBER Working Papers 2848, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Gill, David & Sgroi, Daniel, 2012.
"The optimal choice of pre-launch reviewer,"
Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 147(3), pages 1247-1260.
- David Gill & Daniel Sgroi, 2011. "The Optimal Choice of Pre-Launch Reviewer," Economics Series Working Papers 562, University of Oxford, Department of Economics.
- Stiglitz, Joseph E, 1975.
"The Theory of "Screening," Education, and the Distribution of Income,"
American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 65(3), pages 283-300, June.
- Joseph E. Stiglitz, 1973. "The Theory of 'Screening', Education, and the Distribution of Income," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 354, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
- repec:hal:spmain:info:hdl:2441/5mao0mthj59eebth5kqjqgtghb is not listed on IDEAS
- Marco Ottaviani & Andrea Prat, 2001.
"The Value of Public Information in Monopoly,"
Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 69(6), pages 1673-1683, November.
- Marco Ottaviani, 2000. "The Value of Public Information in Monopoly," Econometric Society World Congress 2000 Contributed Papers 1479, Econometric Society.
- Robert J. Aumann, 1995. "Repeated Games with Incomplete Information," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262011476, April.
- Bergemann, Dirk & Pesendorfer, Martin, 2007.
"Information structures in optimal auctions,"
Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 137(1), pages 580-609, November.
- Dirk Bergemann & Martin Pesendorfer, 2001. "Information Structures in Optimal Auctions," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1323, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
- Bergemann, Dirk & Pesendorfer, Martin, 2001. "Information Structures in Optimal Auctions," CEPR Discussion Papers 2991, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Emmanuel Farhi & Josh Lerner & Jean Tirole, 2013.
"Fear of rejection? Tiered certification and transparency,"
RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 44(4), pages 610-631, December.
- Emmanuel Farhi & Josh Lerner & Jean Tirole, "undated". "Fear of Rejection? Tiered Certification and Transparency," Working Paper 78856, Harvard University OpenScholar.
- Emmanuel Farhi & Josh Lerner & Jean Tirole, 2008. "Fear of Rejection? Tiered Certification and Transparency," NBER Working Papers 14457, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Emir Kamenica & Matthew Gentzkow, 2011.
"Bayesian Persuasion,"
American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 101(6), pages 2590-2615, October.
- Emir Kamenica & Matthew Gentzkow, 2009. "Bayesian Persuasion," NBER Working Papers 15540, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Emir Kamenica & Matthew Gentzkow, 2009. "Bayesian Persuasion," NajEcon Working Paper Reviews 814577000000000369, www.najecon.org.
- Dubey, Pradeep & Geanakoplos, John, 2010.
"Grading exams: 100,99,98,... or A,B,C?,"
Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 69(1), pages 72-94, May.
- Pradeep Dubey & John Geanakoplos, 2009. "Grading Exams: 100, 99, 98,... or A, B, C?," Levine's Working Paper Archive 814577000000000361, David K. Levine.
- Pradeep Dubey & John Geanakoplos, 2009. "Grading Exams: 100, 99, 98,...or A, B, C?," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1710, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
- Anton Kolotilin & Tymofiy Mylovanov & Andriy Zapechelnyuk & Ming Li, 2017.
"Persuasion of a Privately Informed Receiver,"
Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 85(6), pages 1949-1964, November.
- Anton Kolotilin & Tymofiy Mylovanov & Andriy Zapechelnyuk & Ming Li, 2016. "Persuasion Of A Privately Informed Receiver," Working Papers 2016_22, Business School - Economics, University of Glasgow.
- Anton Kolotilin & Tymofiy Mylovanov & Andriy Zapechelnyuk & Ming Li, 2016. "Persuasion of a Privately Informed Receiver," Discussion Papers 2016-21, School of Economics, The University of New South Wales.
- Alonso, Ricardo & Câmara, Odilon, 2016.
"Bayesian persuasion with heterogeneous priors,"
Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 165(C), pages 672-706.
- Alonso, Ricardo & Câmara, Odilon, 2016. "Bayesian persuasion with heterogeneous priors," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 67950, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
- Ricardo Alonso & Odilon Câmara, 2016.
"Persuading Voters,"
American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 106(11), pages 3590-3605, November.
- Alonso, Ricardo & Câmara, Odilon, 2014. "Persuading voters," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 58674, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
- Alonso, Ricardo & Câmara, Odilon, 2016. "Persuading voters," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 67953, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
- Olivier Gossner & Jakub Steiner, 2016.
"Optimal Illusion of Control and Related Perception Biases,"
CERGE-EI Working Papers
wp571, The Center for Economic Research and Graduate Education - Economics Institute, Prague.
- Olivier Gossner & Jakub Steiner, 2016. "Optimal Illusion of Control and Related Perception Biases," Edinburgh School of Economics Discussion Paper Series 276, Edinburgh School of Economics, University of Edinburgh.
- Steiner, Jakub & Gossner, Olivier, 2016. "Optimal Illusion of Control and Related Perception Biases," CEPR Discussion Papers 11478, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Olivier Gossner & Jakub Steiner, 2017. "Optimal Illusion of Control and Related Perception Biases," Working Papers 2017-50, Center for Research in Economics and Statistics.
- Kolotilin, Anton, 2018. "Optimal information disclosure: a linear programming approach," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 13(2), May.
- Milgrom, Paul R & Weber, Robert J, 1982.
"A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding,"
Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 50(5), pages 1089-1122, September.
- Paul Milgrom & Robert J. Weber, 1981. "A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding," Discussion Papers 447R, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
- Grossman, Sanford J, 1981. "The Informational Role of Warranties and Private Disclosure about Product Quality," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 24(3), pages 461-483, December.
- Itay Goldstein & Yaron Leitner, 2015. "Stress tests and information disclosure," Working Papers 15-10, Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia.
- Caplin, Andrew & Eliaz, Kfir, 2003. "AIDS Policy and Psychology: A Mechanism-Design Approach," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 34(4), pages 631-646, Winter.
- Eduardo Perez-Richet & Delphine Prady, 2012.
"Complicating to Persuade?,"
Working Papers
hal-00675135, HAL.
- Eduardo Perez & Delphine Prady, 2012. "Complicating to Persuade?," Working Papers hal-03583827, HAL.
- Eduardo Perez & Delphine Prady, 2012. "Complicating to Persuade?," SciencePo Working papers Main hal-03583827, HAL.
- Gill, David & Sgroi, Daniel, 2008.
"Sequential decisions with tests,"
Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 63(2), pages 663-678, July.
- David Gill & Daniel Sgroi & Faculty of Economics and Churchill College & University of Cambridge, 2005. "Sequential Decisions with Tests," Economics Series Working Papers 242, University of Oxford, Department of Economics.
- Eduardo Perez-Richet, 2014.
"Interim Bayesian Persuasion: First Steps,"
American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 104(5), pages 469-474, May.
- Eduardo Perez, 2015. "Interim Bayesian Persuasion: First Steps," Post-Print hal-03392982, HAL.
- Calzolari, Giacomo & Pavan, Alessandro, 2006.
"On the optimality of privacy in sequential contracting,"
Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 130(1), pages 168-204, September.
- Alessandro Pavan, 2004. "On the Optimality of Privacy in Sequential Contracting," Theory workshop papers 658612000000000067, UCLA Department of Economics.
- Giacomo Calzolari & Alessandro Pavan, 2005. "On the Optimality of Privacy in Sequential Contracting," Discussion Papers 1404, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
- Giacomo Calzolari & Alessandro Pavan, 2004. "On the Optimality of Privacy in Sequential Contracting," Discussion Papers 1394, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
- Romans Pancs, 2014. "Designing Order-Book Transparency In Electronic Communication Networks," Journal of the European Economic Association, European Economic Association, vol. 12(3), pages 702-723, June.
- Thomas Philippon & Vasiliki Skreta, 2012.
"Optimal Interventions in Markets with Adverse Selection,"
American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 102(1), pages 1-28, February.
- Philippon, Thomas & Skreta, Vasiliki, 2010. "Optimal Interventions in Markets with Adverse Selection," CEPR Discussion Papers 7737, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Thomas Philippon & Vasiliki Skreta, 2010. "Optimal Interventions in Markets with Adverse Selection," NBER Working Papers 15785, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Vasiliki Skreta & Thomas Philippon, 2010. "Optimal Interventions in Markets with Adverse Selection," 2010 Meeting Papers 1333, Society for Economic Dynamics.
- Thomas Philippon & Vasiliki Skreta, 2011. "Optimal Interventions in Markets with Adverse Selection," Working Papers 11-11, New York University, Leonard N. Stern School of Business, Department of Economics.
- Alós-Ferrer, Carlos & Prat, Julien, 2012.
"Job market signaling and employer learning,"
Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 147(5), pages 1787-1817.
- Julien Prat & Carlos Alos-Ferrer, 2007. "Job Market Signaling and Employer Learning," 2007 Meeting Papers 648, Society for Economic Dynamics.
- Alós-Ferrer, Carlos & Prat, Julien, 2008. "Job Market Signaling and Employer Learning," IZA Discussion Papers 3285, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
- Steven Matthews & Andrew Postlewaite, 1985. "Quality Testing and Disclosure," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 16(3), pages 328-340, Autumn.
- Luis Rayo & Ilya Segal, 2010. "Optimal Information Disclosure," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 118(5), pages 949-987.
- Giacomo Calzolari & Alessandro Pavan, 2006.
"Monopoly with resale,"
RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 37(2), pages 362-375, June.
- Giacomo Calzolari & Alessandro Pavan, 2003. "Monopoly with Resale," Working Papers 2003.20, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
- Giacomo Calzolari & Alessandro Pavan, 2005. "Monopoly with Resale," Discussion Papers 1405, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
- Giacomo Calzolari & Alessandro Pavan, 2004. "Monopoly with Resale," Discussion Papers 1393, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
- De, Sankar & Nabar, Prafulla, 1991. "Economic implications of imperfect quality certification," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 37(4), pages 333-337, December.
- Arrow, Kenneth J., 1973. "Higher education as a filter," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 2(3), pages 193-216, July.
- Weiss, Andrew, 1983. "A Sorting-cum-Learning Model of Education," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 91(3), pages 420-442, June.
- Menezes, C & Geiss, C & Tressler, J, 1980. "Increasing Downside Risk," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 70(5), pages 921-932, December.
- Matthew Gentzkow & Emir Kamenica, 2017. "Competition in Persuasion," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 84(1), pages 300-322.
- Alessandro Lizzeri, 1999. "Information Revelation and Certification Intermediaries," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 30(2), pages 214-231, Summer.
- Grossman, S J & Hart, O D, 1980.
"Disclosure Laws and Takeover Bids,"
Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 35(2), pages 323-334, May.
- Sanford Grossman & Oliver Hart, "undated". "Disclosure Laws and Takeover Bids," Rodney L. White Center for Financial Research Working Papers 23-79, Wharton School Rodney L. White Center for Financial Research.
- Jean Tirole, 2012. "Overcoming Adverse Selection: How Public Intervention Can Restore Market Functioning," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 102(1), pages 29-59, February.
- Hirshleifer, Jack, 1971. "The Private and Social Value of Information and the Reward to Inventive Activity," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 61(4), pages 561-574, September.
- Titman, Sheridan & Trueman, Brett, 1986. "Information quality and the valuation of new issues," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 8(2), pages 159-172, June.
- Paul R. Milgrom, 1981.
"Good News and Bad News: Representation Theorems and Applications,"
Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 12(2), pages 380-391, Autumn.
- Paul R. Milgrom, 1979. "Good Nevs and Bad News: Representation Theorems and Applications," Discussion Papers 407R, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
- repec:oup:restud:v:84:y::i:1:p:300-322. is not listed on IDEAS
- Matthew Gentzkow & Emir Kamenica, 2014. "Costly Persuasion," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 104(5), pages 457-462, May.
- Talia Bar & Vrinda Kadiyali & Asaf Zussman, 2012. "Putting Grades in Context," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 30(2), pages 445-478.
- Michael Ostrovsky & Michael Schwarz, 2010.
"Information Disclosure and Unraveling in Matching Markets,"
American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 2(2), pages 34-63, May.
- Ostrovsky, Michael & Schwarz, Michael, 2007. "Information Disclosure and Unraveling in Matching Markets," Research Papers 1965, Stanford University, Graduate School of Business.
- Michael Ostrovsky & Michael Schwarz, 2008. "Information Disclosure and Unraveling in Matching Markets," NBER Working Papers 13766, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Charalambos D. Aliprantis & Kim C. Border, 2006. "Infinite Dimensional Analysis," Springer Books, Springer, edition 0, number 978-3-540-29587-7, October.
- Daley, Brendan & Green, Brett, 2014. "Market signaling with grades," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 151(C), pages 114-145.
- Jean-Pierre Benoit & Juan Dubra, 2004.
"Why Do Good Cops Defend Bad Cops?,"
International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 45(3), pages 787-809, August.
- Juan Dubra, 2004. "Why do Good Cops Defend Bad Cops?," Econometric Society 2004 Latin American Meetings 342, Econometric Society.
- Michael Spence, 1973. "Job Market Signaling," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 87(3), pages 355-374.
Citations
Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
Cited by:
- Perez-Richet, Eduardo & Vigier, Adrien & Bizzotto, Jacopo, 2019.
"Information Design with Agency,"
CEPR Discussion Papers
13868, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Jacopo Bizzotto & Eduardo Perez-Richet & Adrien Vigier, 2020. "Information Design with Agency," SciencePo Working papers Main hal-03874017, HAL.
- Jacopo Bizzotto & Eduardo Perez-Richet & Adrien Vigier, 2020. "Information Design with Agency," Working Papers hal-03874017, HAL.
- Eduardo Perez‐Richet & Vasiliki Skreta, 2022.
"Test Design Under Falsification,"
Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 90(3), pages 1109-1142, May.
- Eduardo Perez & Vasiliki Skreta, 2018. "Test Design Under Falsification," SciencePo Working papers Main hal-03393136, HAL.
- Eduardo Perez & Vasiliki Skreta, 2018. "Test Design Under Falsification," SciencePo Working papers hal-03393136, HAL.
- Eduardo Perez-Richet & Vasiliki Skreta, 2022. "Test Design Under Falsification," SciencePo Working papers Main hal-03873972, HAL.
- Skreta, Vasiliki & Perez-Richet, Eduardo, 2021. "Test Design under Falsification," CEPR Discussion Papers 15627, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Eduardo Perez-Richet & Vasiliki Skreta, 2022. "Test Design Under Falsification," Post-Print hal-03873972, HAL.
- Eduardo Perez & Vasiliki Skreta, 2018. "Test Design Under Falsification," Working Papers hal-03393136, HAL.
- Choi, Jay Pil & Mukherjee, Arijit, 2019. "Optimal certification policy, entry, and investment in the presence of public signals," Working Papers 2019-6, Michigan State University, Department of Economics.
- Smolin, Alex & Doval, Laura, 2021.
"Information Payoffs: An Interim Perspective,"
TSE Working Papers
21-1247, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE).
- Smolin, Alex & Doval, Laura, 2021. "Information Payoffs: An Interim Perspective," CEPR Discussion Papers 16543, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Jacopo Bizzotto & Eduardo Perez-Richet & Adrien Vigier, 2020.
"Communication via Third Parties,"
Working Papers
202006, Oslo Metropolitan University, Oslo Business School.
- Jacopo Bizzotto & Eduardo Perez-Richet & Adrien Vigier, 2022. "Communication via Third Parties," SciencePo Working papers Main hal-03874010, HAL.
- Jacopo Bizzotto & Eduardo Perez-Richet & Adrien Vigier, 2021. "Communication via Third Parties," Working Papers 202106, Oslo Metropolitan University, Oslo Business School.
- Jacopo Bizzotto & Eduardo Perez-Richet & Adrien Vigier, 2022. "Communication via Third Parties," Working Papers hal-03874010, HAL.
- Jacopo Bizzotto & Adrien Vigier, 2022. "A Case for Tiered School Systems," Working Papers 202205, Oslo Metropolitan University, Oslo Business School.
- Alonso, Ricardo & Câmara, Odilon, 2018.
"On the value of persuasion by experts,"
Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 174(C), pages 103-123.
- Alonso, Ricardo & Câmara, Odilon, 2014. "On the value of persuasion by experts," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 58677, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
- Alonso, Ricardo & Câmara, Odilon, 2018. "On the value of persuasion by experts," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 86370, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
- Alonso, Ricardo & Câmara, Odilon, 2017. "On the Value of Persuasion by Experts," CEPR Discussion Papers 12482, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Laura Doval & Alex Smolin, 2024.
"Persuasion and Welfare,"
Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 132(7), pages 2451-2487.
- Laura Doval & Alex Smolin, 2021. "Persuasion and Welfare," Papers 2109.03061, arXiv.org, revised Sep 2023.
- Doval, Laura & Smolin, Alex, 2023. "Persuasion and Welfare," CEPR Discussion Papers 18104, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Marta Serra-Garcia & Nora Szech, 2023.
"Incentives and Defaults Can Increase COVID-19 Vaccine Intentions and Test Demand,"
Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 69(2), pages 1037-1049, February.
- Marta Serra-Garcia & Nora Szech, 2021. "Incentives and Defaults Can Increase Covid-19 Vaccine Intentions and Test Demand," CESifo Working Paper Series 9003, CESifo.
- Jay Pil Choi & Arijit Mukherjee, 2020. "Optimal certification policy, entry, and investment in the presence of public signals," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 51(4), pages 989-1013, December.
- Ginzburg, Boris, 2019.
"A Simple Model of Competitive Testing,"
MPRA Paper
99463, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Ginzburg, Boris, 2019. "A Simple Model of Competitive Testing," MPRA Paper 94605, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Escudé, Matteo & Sinander, Ludvig, 2023.
"Slow persuasion,"
Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 18(1), January.
- Matteo Escud'e & Ludvig Sinander, 2019. "Slow persuasion," Papers 1903.09055, arXiv.org, revised Apr 2022.
- Nikolaus Schweizer & Nora Szech, 2018.
"Optimal Revelation of Life-Changing Information,"
Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 64(11), pages 5250-5262, November.
- Nikolaus Schweizer & Nora Szech, 2016. "Optimal Revelation of Life-Changing Information," CESifo Working Paper Series 5941, CESifo.
- Schweizer, Nikolaus & Szech, Nora, 2016. "Optimal revelation of life-changing information," Working Paper Series in Economics 90, Karlsruhe Institute of Technology (KIT), Department of Economics and Management.
- Jacopo Bizzotto & Adrien Vigier, 2022. "Sorting and Grading," Papers 2208.10894, arXiv.org, revised Feb 2024.
- Emir Kamenica & Kyungmin Kim & Andriy Zapechelnyuk, 2021. "Bayesian persuasion and information design: perspectives and open issues," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 72(3), pages 701-704, October.
Most related items
These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.- Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris, 2019.
"Information Design: A Unified Perspective,"
Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 57(1), pages 44-95, March.
- Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris, 2017. "Information Design: A Unified Perspective," Working Papers 089_2017, Princeton University, Department of Economics, Econometric Research Program..
- Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris, 2017. "Information Design: A Unified Perspective," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 2075R2, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University, revised Nov 2017.
- Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris, 2017. "Information Design: A Unified Perspective," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 2075R, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University, revised Mar 2017.
- Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris, 2017. "Information Design: A Unified Perspective," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 2075, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
- Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris, 2017. "Information Design: A Unified Perspective," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 2075R3, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University, revised Mar 2018.
- Bergemann, Dirk & Morris, Stephen, 2017. "Information Design: A Unified Perspective," CEPR Discussion Papers 11867, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Kolotilin, Anton, 2015.
"Experimental design to persuade,"
Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 90(C), pages 215-226.
- Anton Kolotilin, 2013. "Experimental Design to Persuade," Discussion Papers 2013-17, School of Economics, The University of New South Wales.
- Hedlund, Jonas, 2017. "Bayesian persuasion by a privately informed sender," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 167(C), pages 229-268.
- Arianna Degan & Ming Li, 2021. "Persuasion with costly precision," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 72(3), pages 869-908, October.
- Glode, Vincent & Opp, Christian C. & Zhang, Xingtan, 2018. "Voluntary disclosure in bilateral transactions," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 175(C), pages 652-688.
- Xinyan Shi, 2013. "Information disclosure and vaccination externalities," International Journal of Economic Theory, The International Society for Economic Theory, vol. 9(3), pages 229-243, September.
- Harbaugh, Richmond & To, Theodore, 2020.
"False modesty: When disclosing good news looks bad,"
Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 87(C), pages 43-55.
- Rick Harbaugh & Theodore To, 2005. "False Modesty: When Disclosing Good News Looks Bad," Working Papers 2005-05, Indiana University, Kelley School of Business, Department of Business Economics and Public Policy.
- Anton Kolotilin & Tymofiy Mylovanov & Andriy Zapechelnyuk & Ming Li, 2017.
"Persuasion of a Privately Informed Receiver,"
Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 85(6), pages 1949-1964, November.
- Anton Kolotilin & Tymofiy Mylovanov & Andriy Zapechelnyuk & Ming Li, 2016. "Persuasion of a Privately Informed Receiver," Discussion Papers 2016-21, School of Economics, The University of New South Wales.
- Anton Kolotilin & Tymofiy Mylovanov & Andriy Zapechelnyuk & Ming Li, 2016. "Persuasion Of A Privately Informed Receiver," Working Papers 2016_22, Business School - Economics, University of Glasgow.
- Kolotilin, Anton & Li, Hongyi, 2021.
"Relational communication,"
Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 16(4), November.
- Anton Kolotilin & Hongyi, 2018. "Relational Communication," Discussion Papers 2018-12, School of Economics, The University of New South Wales.
- Anton Kolotilin & Hongyi, 2019. "Relational Communication," Discussion Papers 2018-12a, School of Economics, The University of New South Wales.
- Anton Kolotilin & Hongyi Li, 2019. "Relational Communication," Papers 1901.05645, arXiv.org, revised Dec 2020.
- Anton Kolotilin & Hongyi, 2020. "Relational Communication," Discussion Papers 2018-12b, School of Economics, The University of New South Wales.
- Alonso, Ricardo & Câmara, Odilon, 2016.
"Bayesian persuasion with heterogeneous priors,"
Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 165(C), pages 672-706.
- Alonso, Ricardo & Câmara, Odilon, 2016. "Bayesian persuasion with heterogeneous priors," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 67950, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
- Bruce Carlin & Christopher Cotton & Raphael Boleslavsky, 2017.
"Competing For Capital: Auditing And Credibility In Financial Reporting,"
Working Paper
1377, Economics Department, Queen's University.
- Raphael Boleslavsky & Bruce I. Carlin & Christopher Cotton, 2017. "Competing for Capital: Auditing and Credibility in Financial Reporting," NBER Working Papers 23273, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Sonin, Konstantin & Egorov, Georgy, 2019.
"Persuasion on Networks,"
CEPR Discussion Papers
13723, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Georgy Egorov & Konstantin Sonin, 2020. "Persuasion on Networks," NBER Working Papers 27631, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Eduardo Perez-Richet, 2014.
"Interim Bayesian Persuasion: First Steps,"
American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 104(5), pages 469-474, May.
- Eduardo Perez, 2015. "Interim Bayesian Persuasion: First Steps," Post-Print hal-03392982, HAL.
- Goldstein, Itay & Leitner, Yaron, 2018. "Stress tests and information disclosure," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 177(C), pages 34-69.
- Tsakas, Elias & Tsakas, Nikolas, 2021.
"Noisy persuasion,"
Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 130(C), pages 44-61.
- Elias Tsakas & Nikolas Tsakas, 2018. "Noisy Persuasion," University of Cyprus Working Papers in Economics 11-2018, University of Cyprus Department of Economics.
- Florian Hoffmann & Roman Inderst & Marco Ottaviani, 2020.
"Persuasion Through Selective Disclosure: Implications for Marketing, Campaigning, and Privacy Regulation,"
Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 66(11), pages 4958-4979, November.
- Hoffmann, Florian & Inderst, Roman & Ottaviani, Marco, 2022. "Persuasion Through Selective Disclosure: Implications for Marketing, Campaigning, and Privacy Regulation," CEPR Discussion Papers 16901, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Hedlund, Jonas, 2014. "Bayesian signaling," Working Papers 0577, University of Heidelberg, Department of Economics.
- Kolotilin, Anton, 2018. "Optimal information disclosure: a linear programming approach," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 13(2), May.
- Ming Hu & Zizhuo Wang & Yinbo Feng, 2020. "Information Disclosure and Pricing Policies for Sales of Network Goods," Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 68(4), pages 1162-1177, July.
- Tom Lane & Minghai Zhou, 2022. "Failure of unravelling theory? A natural field experiment on voluntary quality disclosure," Discussion Papers 2022-17, The Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics, School of Economics, University of Nottingham.
More about this item
Keywords
Test design; Bayesian learning; Concavification; False positive; Asymmetric information; Voluntary participation;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- D02 - Microeconomics - - General - - - Institutions: Design, Formation, Operations, and Impact
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
Statistics
Access and download statisticsCorrections
All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:104:y:2017:i:c:p:632-655. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Catherine Liu (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/622836 .
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.