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Persuading voters

Listed author(s):
  • Alonso, Ricardo
  • Câmara, Odilon

In a symmetric information voting model, an individual (politician) can influence voters' choices by strategically designing a policy experiment (public signal). We characterize the politician's optimal experiment. With a non-unanimous voting rule, she exploits voters' heterogeneity by designing an experiment with realizations targeting different winning coalitions. Consequently, under a simple-majority rule, a majority of voters might be strictly worse off due to the politician's influence. We characterize voters' preferences over electoral rules and provide conditions for a majority of voters to prefer a supermajority (or unanimity) voting rule, in order to induce the politician to supply a more informative experiment.

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File URL: http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/67953/
File Function: Open access version.
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Paper provided by London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library in its series LSE Research Online Documents on Economics with number 67953.

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Date of creation: 11 Nov 2016
Publication status: Published in American Economic Review, 11, November, 2016, 106(11), pp. 3590-3605. ISSN: 0002-8282
Handle: RePEc:ehl:lserod:67953
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  1. Ina A Taneva, 2015. "Information Design," ESE Discussion Papers 256, Edinburgh School of Economics, University of Edinburgh.
  2. Gill, David & Sgroi, Daniel, 2008. "Sequential decisions with tests," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 63(2), pages 663-678, July.
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  4. Luis Rayo & Ilya Segal, 2010. "Optimal Information Disclosure," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 118(5), pages 949-987.
  5. Jackson, Matthew O. & Tan, Xu, 2013. "Deliberation, disclosure of information, and voting," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 148(1), pages 2-30.
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  10. Ivanov, Maxim, 2010. "Informational control and organizational design," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 145(2), pages 721-751, March.
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  12. repec:cup:apsrev:v:105:y:2011:i:04:p:643-662_00 is not listed on IDEAS
  13. Wouter Dessein, 2002. "Authority and Communication in Organizations," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 69(4), pages 811-838.
  14. Hao Li, 2001. "A Theory of Conservatism," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 109(3), pages 617-636, June.
  15. J. Duggan & C. Martinelli, 2011. "A Spatial Theory of Media Slant and Voter Choice," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 78(2), pages 640-666.
  16. Schnakenberg, Keith E., 2015. "Expert advice to a voting body," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 160(C), pages 102-113.
  17. Yun Wang, 2015. "Bayesian Persuasion with Multiple Receivers," WISE Working Papers 2015-03-24, Wang Yanan Institute for Studies in Economics (WISE), Xiamen University.
  18. Alonso, Ricardo & Câmara, Odilon, 2016. "Political disagreement and information in elections," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 100(C), pages 390-412.
  19. Fernandez, Raquel & Rodrik, Dani, 1991. "Resistance to Reform: Status Quo Bias in the Presence of Individual-Specific Uncertainty," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 81(5), pages 1146-1155, December.
  20. B. Douglas Bernheim & Antonio Rangel & Luis Rayo, 2006. "The Power of the Last Word in Legislative Policy Making," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 74(5), pages 1161-1190, September.
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