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The option to wait in collective decisions and optimal majority rules

  • Messner, Matthias
  • Polborn, Mattias K.

We consider a model in which voters over time receive more information about their preferences concerning an irreversible social decision. Voters can either implement the project in the first period, or they can postpone the decision to the second period. We analyze the effects of different majority rules. Individual first period voting behavior may become “less conservative” under supermajority rules, and it is even possible that a project is implemented in the first period under a supermajority rule that would not be implemented under simple majority rule.

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Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of Public Economics.

Volume (Year): 96 (2012)
Issue (Month): 5 ()
Pages: 524-540

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Handle: RePEc:eee:pubeco:v:96:y:2012:i:5:p:524-540
Contact details of provider: Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/505578

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  10. Gersbach, Hans, 1993. "Politics and the Choice of Durability: Comment," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 83(3), pages 670-73, June.
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  14. Fernandez, Raquel & Rodrik, Dani, 1991. "Resistance to Reform: Status Quo Bias in the Presence of Individual-Specific Uncertainty," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 81(5), pages 1146-55, December.
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