The option to wait in collective decisions and optimal majority rules
We consider a model in which voters over time receive more information about their preferences concerning an irreversible social decision. Voters can either implement the project in the first period, or they can postpone the decision to the second period. We analyze the effects of different majority rules. Individual first period voting behavior may become “less conservative” under supermajority rules, and it is even possible that a project is implemented in the first period under a supermajority rule that would not be implemented under simple majority rule.
Volume (Year): 96 (2012)
Issue (Month): 5 ()
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