Democratic Mechanisms: Double Majority Rules and Flexible Agenda Costs
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- Hans Gersbach, 2002. "Democratic Mechanisms: Double Majority Rules and Flexible Agenda Costs," CESifo Working Paper Series 749, CESifo.
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- Lukach, R. & Plasmans, J.E.J., 2002. "Measuring Knowledge Spillovers using Patent Citations : Evidence from the Belgian Firm's Data," Other publications TiSEM d78bf59a-e0ff-4451-86b9-1, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
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Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 37(2), pages 219-268, July.
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- Gersbach, Hans & Siemers, Lars, 2005. "Can Democracy Educate a Society?," IZA Discussion Papers 1693, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
- Philippe Aghion & Patrick Bolton, 2003.
"Incomplete Social Contracts,"
Journal of the European Economic Association, MIT Press, vol. 1(1), pages 38-67, March.
- Aghion, Philippe & Bolton, Patrick, 2003. "Incomplete Social Contracts," Scholarly Articles 4554123, Harvard University Department of Economics.
- Toke S Aidt & Francesco Giovannoni, 2004.
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- Francesco Giovannoni & Toke S. Aidt, 2004. "Constitutional Rules," Econometric Society 2004 North American Summer Meetings 540, Econometric Society.
- Felix Bierbrauer & Marco Sahm, 2008. "Optimal Democratic Mechanisms for Taxation and Public Good Provision," Discussion Paper Series of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods 2008_09, Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods.
- Bierbrauer, Felix & Sahm, Marco, 2006. "Informative Voting and the Samuelson Rule," Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems 159, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich.
- Felix Bierbrauer & Marco Sahm, 2006. "Informative Voting and the Samuelson Rule," Discussion Paper Series of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods 2006_18, Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods.
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More about this item
Keywords
democratic constitutions; double majority rules; flexible agenda cost rules; unobservable utilities;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- D62 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Externalities
- D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
- H40 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - General
NEP fields
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:- NEP-CDM-2005-06-14 (Collective Decision-Making)
- NEP-PBE-2005-06-14 (Public Economics)
- NEP-POL-2005-06-14 (Positive Political Economics)
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