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The Design of Transnational Public Good Mechanisms for Developing Countries

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  • Laffont, Jean-Jacques
  • Martimort, David

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  • Laffont, Jean-Jacques & Martimort, David, 2004. "The Design of Transnational Public Good Mechanisms for Developing Countries," IDEI Working Papers 267, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse.
    • Handle: RePEc:ide:wpaper:636
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    1. Didier Laussel & Thomas R. Palfrey, 2003. "Efficient Equilibria in the Voluntary Contributions Mechanism with Private Information," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 5(3), pages 449-478, July.
    2. Antoine Faure-Grimaud & Jean-Jacques Laffont & David Martimort, 2003. "Collusion, Delegation and Supervision with Soft Information," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 70(2), pages 253-279.
    3. Walker, Mark, 1980. "On the Nonexistence of a Dominant Strategy Mechanism for Making Optimal Public Decisions," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 48(6), pages 1521-1540, September.
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    5. Martimort, David & Moreira, Humberto Ataíde, 2004. "Common agency with informed principals," FGV EPGE Economics Working Papers (Ensaios Economicos da EPGE) 551, EPGE Brazilian School of Economics and Finance - FGV EPGE (Brazil).
    6. Green, Jerry & Laffont, Jean-Jacques, 1977. "Characterization of Satisfactory Mechanisms for the Revelation of Preferences for Public Goods," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 45(2), pages 427-438, March.
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    10. Myerson, Roger B. & Satterthwaite, Mark A., 1983. "Efficient mechanisms for bilateral trading," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 29(2), pages 265-281, April.
    11. David Martimort, 2001. "Optimal Taxation and Strategic Budget Deficit Under Political Regime Switching," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 68(3), pages 573-592.
    12. Steven R. Williams, 1999. "A characterization of efficient, bayesian incentive compatible mechanisms," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 14(1), pages 155-180.
    13. d'Aspremont, Claude & Gerard-Varet, Louis-Andre, 1979. "Incentives and incomplete information," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 11(1), pages 25-45, February.
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    15. Sandler, Todd, 2001. "On financing global and international public goods," Policy Research Working Paper Series 2638, The World Bank.
    16. Todd Sandler, 1998. "Global and regional public goods: a prognosis for collective action," Fiscal Studies, Institute for Fiscal Studies, vol. 19(3), pages 221-247, August.
    17. Maskin, Eric & Tirole, Jean, 1990. "The Principal-Agent Relationship with an Informed Principal: The Case of Private Values," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 58(2), pages 379-409, March.
    18. Nahum D. Melumad & Dilip Mookherjee & Stefan Reichelstein, 1995. "Hierarchical Decentralization of Incentive Contracts," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 26(4), pages 654-672, Winter.
    19. Green, Jerry & Laffont, Jean-Jacques, 1977. "On the revelation of preferences for public goods," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 8(1), pages 79-93, August.
    20. John O. Ledyard & Thomas R. Palfrey, 1999. "A Characterization of Interim Efficiency with Public Goods," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 67(2), pages 435-448, March.
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    23. Menezes, Flavio M. & Monteiro, Paulo K. & Temimi, Akram, 2001. "Private provision of discrete public goods with incomplete information," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 35(4), pages 493-514, July.
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    Cited by:

    1. Johan Fourie, 2006. "Some policy proposals for future infrastructure investment in South Africa," Working Papers 05/2006, Stellenbosch University, Department of Economics.
    2. Acocella Nicola & Di Bartolomeo Giovanni, 2013. "Population location, commuting and local public goods: A political economy approach," wp.comunite 0105, Department of Communication, University of Teramo.
    3. Michael Jakob & Kai Lessmann, 2012. "Signaling in international environmental agreements: the case of early and delayed action," International Environmental Agreements: Politics, Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 12(4), pages 309-325, November.
    4. David Martimort & Wilfried Sand‐Zantman, 2013. "Solving the global warming problem: beyond markets, simple mechanisms may help!," Canadian Journal of Economics/Revue canadienne d'économique, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 46(2), pages 361-378, May.
    5. Jin Kim & Shim, Seungjin, 2006. "Incentive mechanisms for international public goods under uncertainty of production costs," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 92(3), pages 311-316, September.
    6. Martimort, David & Sand-Zantman, Wilfried, 2011. "A Mechanism Design Approach to Climate Agreements," TSE Working Papers 11-251, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE), revised 30 Apr 2013.
    7. Kartasheva, Anastasia V., 2012. "Design of investment promotion policies," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 30(2), pages 127-136.
    8. Martin Besfamille & Cecilia Parlatore Siritto, 2009. "Modernization of Tax Administrations and Optimal Fiscal Policies," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 11(6), pages 897-926, December.
    9. Per-Olov Johansson & Ginés de Rus, 2015. "On the Treatment of Foreigners and Foreign-Owned Firms in Cost–Benefit Analysis," Working Papers 2015-13, FEDEA.
    10. He Chang & Huimin Liu & Shuai Jin, 2023. "Design of a river chief incentive mechanism based on blockchain: A principal–agent model," Managerial and Decision Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 44(3), pages 1534-1546, April.
    11. Johan Fourie, 2006. "Economic Infrastructure: A Review Of Definitions, Theory And Empirics," South African Journal of Economics, Economic Society of South Africa, vol. 74(3), pages 530-556, September.

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • H41 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Public Goods
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design

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