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Government and the provision of public goods: from equilibrium models to mechanism design

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Abstract

Focusing on their analysis of the optimal public goods provision problem, this paper follows the parallel development of equilibrium models and mechanism design after the accomodation of Samuelson's definition of collective goods to the general equilibrium framework. Both paradigms lead to the negative conclusion of the impossibility of a fully decentralized optimal public goods provision through market or market-like institutions

Suggested Citation

  • Monique Florenzano, 2010. "Government and the provision of public goods: from equilibrium models to mechanism design," Documents de travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne 10084, Université Panthéon-Sorbonne (Paris 1), Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne.
  • Handle: RePEc:mse:cesdoc:10084
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    File URL: ftp://mse.univ-paris1.fr/pub/mse/CES2010/10084.pdf
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    1. Bonnisseau, Jean-Marc, 1991. "Existence of Lindahl equilibria in economies with nonconvex production sets," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 54(2), pages 409-416, August.
    2. Monique Florenzano, 2009. "Walras-Lindahl-Wicksell: What equilibrium concept for public goods provision? I - The convex case," Documents de travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne 09009, Université Panthéon-Sorbonne (Paris 1), Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne.
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    Cited by:

    1. repec:ura:ecregj:v:1:y:2018:i:1:p:13-28 is not listed on IDEAS
    2. Yahya Madra & Fikret Adaman, 2013. "Neoliberal reason and its forms:Depoliticization through economization," Working Papers 2013/07, Bogazici University, Department of Economics.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Lindahl-Foley equilibrium; Wicksell-Foley equilibrium; private provision equilibrium; free-rider problem; mechanism design; incentive compatibility; principal-agent models;

    JEL classification:

    • B20 - Schools of Economic Thought and Methodology - - History of Economic Thought since 1925 - - - General
    • B21 - Schools of Economic Thought and Methodology - - History of Economic Thought since 1925 - - - Microeconomics
    • H10 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government - - - General
    • H41 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Public Goods

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