Government and the provision of public goods: from equilibrium models to mechanism design
Focussing on their analysis of the optimal public goods provision problems, this paper follows the parallel development of equilibrium models and mechanism design after the accommodation of Samuelson's definition of collective goods to the general equilibrium framework. Both paradigms lead to the negative conclusion of the impossibility of a fully decentralized optimal public goods provision throught market or market-like institutions.
|Date of creation:||Oct 2010|
|Date of revision:|
|Publication status:||Published in European Journal of the History of Economic Thought, Taylor & Francis (Routledge), 2010, 17 (4), pp.1047-1077. <10.1080/09672567.2010.499469>|
|Note:||View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-00531464|
|Contact details of provider:|| Web page: https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/|
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- Bonnisseau, Jean-Marc, 1991. "Existence of Lindahl equilibria in economies with nonconvex production sets," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 54(2), pages 409-416, August.
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