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From equilibrium models to mechanism design: On the place and the role of government in the public goods provision analysis in the second part of the twentieth century

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  • Monique Florenzano

    (CES - Centre d'économie de la Sorbonne - UP1 - Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique)

Abstract

Focussing on their analysis of the optimal public goods provision problem, this paper follows the parallel development of equilibrium models and mechanism design after the accommodation of Samuelson's definition of collective goods to the general equilibrium framework. Both paradigms lead to the negative conclusion of the impossibility of a fully decentralized optimal public goods provision through market or market-like institutions.

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  • Monique Florenzano, 2009. "From equilibrium models to mechanism design: On the place and the role of government in the public goods provision analysis in the second part of the twentieth century," Post-Print halshs-00367859, HAL.
    • Handle: RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-00367859
    Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://shs.hal.science/halshs-00367859
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    1. Yahya Madra & Fikret Adaman, 2010. "Public economics after neoliberalism: a theoretical-historical perspective," The European Journal of the History of Economic Thought, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 17(4), pages 1079-1106.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    free-rider problem; incentive compatibility; general equilibrium; Lindahl-Foley equilibrium; Wicksell public competitive equilibrium; private provision equilibrium; mechanism design; équilibre public compétitif; équilibre de provision privée; équilibre de Lindahl; compatibilité des incitations individuelles; problème du passager clandestin;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • B20 - Schools of Economic Thought and Methodology - - History of Economic Thought since 1925 - - - General
    • B21 - Schools of Economic Thought and Methodology - - History of Economic Thought since 1925 - - - Microeconomics
    • H10 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government - - - General
    • H41 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Public Goods

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