IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/taf/eujhet/v17y2010i4p1079-1106.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Public economics after neoliberalism: a theoretical-historical perspective

Author

Listed:
  • Yahya Madra
  • Fikret Adaman

Abstract

Musgravean public economics, as the dominant public policy framework of the post-World War II era, argued that the government can and should supplement the price mechanism in order to create a social order within which a democratic society can flourish. Starting with the late 1970s, this project of public economics has been challenged by the growing dominance of neoliberalism as a form of governmentality that extends the economic logic of markets into the domain of the state and its mode of exercising sovereignty over its subjects. After outlining the historical and the disciplinary context of this challenge, the article maintains that endogenous theoretical confrontations internal to public economics should also be taken into consideration to provide a fuller account of the eclipse of the Musgravean public economics in the era of neoliberalism.

Suggested Citation

  • Yahya Madra & Fikret Adaman, 2010. "Public economics after neoliberalism: a theoretical-historical perspective," The European Journal of the History of Economic Thought, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 17(4), pages 1079-1106.
    • Handle: RePEc:taf:eujhet:v:17:y:2010:i:4:p:1079-1106
    DOI: 10.1080/09672567.2010.482997
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/09672567.2010.482997
    Download Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1080/09672567.2010.482997?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Donald W. Katzner, 2006. "An Introduction to the Economic Theory of Market Behavior," Books, Edward Elgar Publishing, number 3937.
    2. Saari,Donald G., 2001. "Decisions and Elections," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521808163, October.
    3. Mandler, Michael, 2001. "Dilemmas in Economic Theory: Persisting Foundational Problems of Microeconomics," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, number 9780195145755, December.
    4. Saari,Donald G., 2001. "Decisions and Elections," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521004046, October.
    5. Monique Florenzano, 2009. "From equilibrium models to mechanism design: On the place and the role of government in the public goods provision analysis in the second part of the twentieth century," Post-Print halshs-00367859, HAL.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Fikret Adaman & Yahya M. Madra, 2012. "Understanding Neoliberalism as Economization: The Case of the Ecology," Working Papers 2012/04, Bogazici University, Department of Economics.
    2. Murat Arsel & Bengi Akbulut & Fikret Adaman & Yahya M. Madra, 2015. "Forum 2015," Development and Change, International Institute of Social Studies, vol. 46(4), pages 733-761, July.
    3. Oláh, Dániel, 2018. "Neoliberalism as a Political Programme and Elements of its Implementation – A Narrative in Theoretical History," Public Finance Quarterly, Corvinus University of Budapest, vol. 63(1), pages 96-112.
    4. Louis-Gaëtan Giraudet & Antoine Missemer, 2023. "The History of Energy Efficiency in Economics: Breakpoints and Regularities," Post-Print halshs-02301636, HAL.
    5. Bengi Akbulut & Fikret Adaman & Yahya M. Madra, 2015. "The Decimation and Displacement of Development Economics," Working Papers 2015/01, Bogazici University, Department of Economics.
    6. Yahya Madra & Fikret Adaman, 2013. "Neoliberal reason and its forms:Depoliticization through economization," Working Papers 2013/07, Bogazici University, Department of Economics.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Michel Balinski & Rida Laraki, 2022. "Majority Judgment vs. Approval Voting," Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 70(3), pages 1296-1316, May.
    2. Donald Saari, 2006. "Which is better: the Condorcet or Borda winner?," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 26(1), pages 107-129, January.
    3. Aki Lehtinen, 2007. "The Borda rule is also intended for dishonest men," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 133(1), pages 73-90, October.
    4. Herrade Igersheim, 2005. "Extending Xu's results to Arrow''s Impossibility Theorem," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 4(13), pages 1-6.
    5. Conal Duddy & Ashley Piggins & William Zwicker, 2016. "Aggregation of binary evaluations: a Borda-like approach," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 46(2), pages 301-333, February.
    6. Abhijit Chandra & Sunanda Roy, 2013. "On removing Condorcet effects from pairwise election tallies," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 40(4), pages 1143-1158, April.
    7. Shmuel Nitzan, 2010. "Demystifying the ‘metric approach to social compromise with the unanimity criterion’," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 35(1), pages 25-28, June.
    8. Leo Katz, 2010. "A Theory of Loopholes," The Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 39(1), pages 1-31, January.
    9. Shin Sato, 2012. "On strategy-proof social choice under categorization," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 38(3), pages 455-471, March.
    10. Antoinette Baujard, 2006. "L'estimation des préférences individuelles en vue de la décision publique. Problèmes, paradoxes, enjeux," Économie et Prévision, Programme National Persée, vol. 175(4), pages 51-63.
    11. Colignatus, Thomas, 2013. "The performance of four possible rules for selecting the Prime Minister after the Dutch Parliamentary elections of September 2012," MPRA Paper 44158, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 02 Feb 2013.
    12. Peter Emerson, 2013. "The original Borda count and partial voting," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 40(2), pages 353-358, February.
    13. Colignatus, Thomas, 2007. "In a democracy, Bayrou would have won. Application of the Borda Fixed Point method to the 2007 French presidential elections," MPRA Paper 3170, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    14. Daniel Bochsler, 2010. "The Marquis de Condorcet goes to Bern," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 144(1), pages 119-131, July.
    15. Hartvigsen, David, 2006. "Vote trading in public elections," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 52(1), pages 31-48, July.
    16. Arnaud Dellis & Mandar Oak, 2016. "Multiple votes, multiple candidacies and polarization," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 46(1), pages 1-38, January.
    17. Quesada, Antonio, 2005. "A positional version of Arrow's theorem," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 41(8), pages 1053-1059, December.
    18. Herrade Igersheim, 2006. "Invoking a Cartesian Product Structure on Social States: New Resolutions of Sen's and Gibbard's Impossibility Theorems," UFAE and IAE Working Papers 659.06, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC).
    19. Florenz Plassmann & T. Tideman, 2014. "How frequently do different voting rules encounter voting paradoxes in three-candidate elections?," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 42(1), pages 31-75, January.
    20. John W. Patty & Elizabeth Maggie Penn, 2019. "A defense of Arrow’s independence of irrelevant alternatives," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 179(1), pages 145-164, April.

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:taf:eujhet:v:17:y:2010:i:4:p:1079-1106. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Chris Longhurst (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.tandfonline.com/REJH20 .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.