On strategy-proof social choice under categorization
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DOI: 10.1007/s00355-011-0539-0
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References listed on IDEAS
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Cited by:
- Anup Pramanik & Arunava Sen, 2016.
"Pairwise partition graphs and strategy-proof social choice in the exogenous indifference class model,"
Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 47(1), pages 1-24, June.
- Anup Pramanik & Arunava Sen, 2014. "Pairwise Partition Graphs and Strategy-proof Social Choice in the Exogenous Indifference Class Model," ISER Discussion Paper 0898, Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University.
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