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Pareto violations of parliamentary voting systems


  • Boniface Mbih


  • Issofa Moyouwou
  • Jérémy Picot


It has been known for a long time that many binary voting rules can select a Pareto dominated outcome, that is an outcome such that there exists some other alternative which is preferred by every voter. In this paper, we show that some of these rules can select an outcome Pareto dominated in a much stronger sense. Furthermore, our main results are concerned with the evaluation of the likelihood of Pareto dominated outcomes under four social choice rules commonly used in Parliaments or in committees. Given a set of four alternatives and a set of n individuals, we assume anonymous profiles and using analytical methods we compute the proportion of profiles at which the Pareto criterion is violated. Our results show that one should not be especially worried about the existence of the possibility as such.
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Suggested Citation

  • Boniface Mbih & Issofa Moyouwou & Jérémy Picot, 2008. "Pareto violations of parliamentary voting systems," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 34(2), pages 331-358, February.
  • Handle: RePEc:spr:joecth:v:34:y:2008:i:2:p:331-358
    DOI: 10.1007/s00199-006-0184-5

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    References listed on IDEAS

    1. Mueller,Dennis C., 2003. "Public Choice III," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521894753, April.
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    Cited by:

    1. Ahmadou lô Gueye, 2014. "Failures of reversal symmetry under two common voting rules," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 34(3), pages 1970-1975.
    2. Shin Sato, 2012. "On strategy-proof social choice under categorization," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 38(3), pages 455-471, March.
    3. repec:eee:matsoc:v:89:y:2017:i:c:p:70-82 is not listed on IDEAS
    4. Boniface Mbih & Issofa Moyouwou & Abdoul Aziz Ndiaye, 2009. "Parliamentary voting rules and strategic candidacy," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 29(2), pages 1371-1379.
    5. Boniface Mbih & Sébastien Courtin & Issofa Moyouwou, 2010. "Susceptibility to coalitional strategic sponsoring," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 144(1), pages 133-151, July.
    6. Sebastien Courtin & Boniface Mbih & Issofa Moyouwou, 2009. "Susceptibility to coalitional strategic sponsoring The case of parliamentary agendas," Post-Print hal-00914855, HAL.

    More about this item


    Pareto criterion; Parliamentary voting rules; Impartial anonymous culture; D71;

    JEL classification:

    • D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations


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