Susceptibility to coalitional strategic sponsoring
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Volume (Year): 144 (2010)
Issue (Month): 1 (July)
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References listed on IDEAS
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- Dutta, Bhaskar & Jackson, Matthew O. & Le Breton, Michel, 2002. "Voting by Successive Elimination and Strategic Candidacy," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 103(1), pages 190-218, March.
- Boniface Mbih & Issofa Moyouwou & Jérémy Picot, 2008.
"Pareto violations of parliamentary voting systems,"
Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 34(2), pages 331-358, February.
- Gibbard, Allan, 1973. "Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 41(4), pages 587-601, July.
- Miller, Nicholas R & Grofman, Bernard & Feld, Scott L, 1990. "The Structure of the Banks Set," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 66(3), pages 243-51, September.
- Gehrlein, William V. & Fishburn, Peter C., 1976. "The probability of the paradox of voting: A computable solution," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 13(1), pages 14-25, August.
- Kuga, Kiyoshi & Nagatani, Hiroaki, 1974. "Voter Antagonism and the Paradox of Voting," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 42(6), pages 1045-67, November.
- Barberà, Salvador & Coelho, Danilo, 2010.
"On the rule of k names,"
Games and Economic Behavior,
Elsevier, vol. 70(1), pages 44-61, September.
- Salvador Barberà & Danilo Coelho, 2004. "On the rule of K names," Working Papers 264, Barcelona Graduate School of Economics.
- Salvador Barberà & Danilo Coelho, 2004. "On the rule of K names," UFAE and IAE Working Papers 636.04, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC), revised 13 Mar 2007.
- Blair, Douglas H, 1981. "On the Ubiquity of Strategic Voting Opportunities," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 22(3), pages 649-55, October.
- Banks, Jeffrey S., 1984. "Sophisticated Voting Outcomes and Agenda Control," Working Papers 524, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences.
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