Empirical social choice: An introduction
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- Peter Kurrild-Klitgaard, 2014. "Empirical social choice: an introduction," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 158(3), pages 297-310, March.
References listed on IDEAS
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Cited by:
- Mehdi Feizi & Rasoul Ramezanian & Saeed Malek Sadati, 2020. "Borda paradox in the 2017 Iranian presidential election: empirical evidence from opinion polls," Economics of Governance, Springer, vol. 21(2), pages 101-113, June.
- Kurrild-Klitgaard, Peter, 2018.
"Trump, Condorcet and Borda: Voting paradoxes in the 2016 Republican presidential primaries,"
European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 55(C), pages 29-35.
- Kurrild-Klitgaard, Peter, 2016. "Trump, Condorcet and Borda: Voting paradoxes in the 2016 Republican presidential primaries," MPRA Paper 75598, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Kurrild-Klitgaard, Peter, 2016. "The cyclical social choice of primary vs. general election candidates: A note on the US 2016 presidential election," MPRA Paper 69171, University Library of Munich, Germany.
More about this item
Keywords
Social choice; Condorcet’s Paradox; voting theory; voting paradoxes; preferences; heresthetics.;JEL classification:
- B2 - Schools of Economic Thought and Methodology - - History of Economic Thought since 1925
- B3 - Schools of Economic Thought and Methodology - - History of Economic Thought: Individuals
- D6 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics
- D69 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Other
- D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
- D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
NEP fields
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:- NEP-CDM-2014-02-08 (Collective Decision-Making)
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