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An Empirical Example of the Condorcet Paradox of Voting in a Large Electorate

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  • Kurrild-Klitgaard, Peter

Abstract

Social choice theory suggests that the occurrence of cyclical collective preferences should be a widespread phenomenon, especially in large groups of decision-makers. However, empirical research has so far failed to produce evidence of the existence of many real-world examples of such, and none in large electorates. This paper demonstrates the existence of a real cyclical majority in a poll of Danish voters' preferred prime minister, using pair-wise comparisons. This result is compared with those of a similar poll, but by using different voting methods, each resulting in different choices. The example demonstrates the empirical reality of cyclical collective preferences and the importance of the choice of institutions. Copyright 2001 by Kluwer Academic Publishers

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  • Kurrild-Klitgaard, Peter, 2001. "An Empirical Example of the Condorcet Paradox of Voting in a Large Electorate," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 107(1-2), pages 135-145, April.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:107:y:2001:i:1-2:p:135-45
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    As found by EconAcademics.org, the blog aggregator for Economics research:
    1. Empirical social choice - special issue of "Public Choice"
      by Peter Kurrild-Klitgaard in Peter Kurrild-Klitgaard on 2014-02-17 15:15:00

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    Cited by:

    1. Lachat, Romain & Laslier, Jean-François, 2024. "Alternatives to plurality rule for single-winner elections: When do they make a difference?," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 81(C).
    2. repec:ejw:journl:v:12:y:2015:i:3:p:400-431 is not listed on IDEAS
    3. Michel L. Balinski & Rida Laraki, 2015. "Majority Measures," Working Papers hal-01137173, HAL.
    4. Mostapha Diss & Eric Kamwa, 2020. "Simulations in Models of Preference Aggregation," Post-Print hal-02424936, HAL.
    5. Richard Potthoff, 2013. "Simple manipulation-resistant voting systems designed to elect Condorcet candidates and suitable for large-scale public elections," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 40(1), pages 101-122, January.
    6. Johannes Pollak, 2004. "Democracy and the European Constitution: Majority Voting and Small Member States," The Constitutionalism Web-Papers p0019, University of Hamburg, Faculty for Economics and Social Sciences, Department of Social Sciences, Institute of Political Science.
    7. Mehdi Feizi & Rasoul Ramezanian & Saeed Malek Sadati, 2020. "Borda paradox in the 2017 Iranian presidential election: empirical evidence from opinion polls," Economics of Governance, Springer, vol. 21(2), pages 101-113, June.
    8. William Gehrlein, 2002. "Condorcet's paradox and the likelihood of its occurrence: different perspectives on balanced preferences ," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 52(2), pages 171-199, March.
    9. Peter Kurrild-Klitgaard, 2012. "Modeling constitutional choice: reflections on The Calculus of Consent 50 years on," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 152(3), pages 407-413, September.
    10. Peter Kurrild-Klitgaard, 2014. "Picking a loser? A social choice perspective on the Danish government formation of 1975," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 158(3), pages 483-497, March.
    11. Mogens K. Justesen, 2007. "The Social Choice of EU Treaties," European Union Politics, , vol. 8(4), pages 537-553, December.
    12. Adrian Deemen, 2014. "On the empirical relevance of Condorcet’s paradox," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 158(3), pages 311-330, March.
    13. Salvatore Barbaro & Nils D. Steiner, 2022. "Majority principle and indeterminacy in German elections," Working Papers 2202, Gutenberg School of Management and Economics, Johannes Gutenberg-Universität Mainz.
    14. Kurrild-Klitgaard, Peter, 2011. "Election inversions, coalitions and proportional representation: Examples from Danish elections," MPRA Paper 35302, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    15. repec:dau:papers:123456789/15122 is not listed on IDEAS
    16. Kaizhao Liu & Qi Long & Zhekun Shi & Weijie J. Su & Jiancong Xiao, 2025. "Statistical Impossibility and Possibility of Aligning LLMs with Human Preferences: From Condorcet Paradox to Nash Equilibrium," Papers 2503.10990, arXiv.org.
    17. Kurrild-Klitgaard, Peter, 2018. "Trump, Condorcet and Borda: Voting paradoxes in the 2016 Republican presidential primaries," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 55(C), pages 29-35.
    18. Harrison-Trainor, Matthew, 2022. "An analysis of random elections with large numbers of voters," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 116(C), pages 68-84.
    19. Mohajan, Haradhan, 2011. "Majority judgment in an election with Borda majority count," MPRA Paper 50846, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 15 Sep 2011.
    20. Mostapha Diss & Eric Kamwa, 2019. "Simulations in Models of Preference Aggregation," Working Papers hal-02424936, HAL.
    21. Luigi Mittone, 2003. "The Condorcet paradox: an experimental approach to a voting process," CEEL Working Papers 0306, Cognitive and Experimental Economics Laboratory, Department of Economics, University of Trento, Italia.
    22. Farzane Karami & Alireza B. Dariane, 2018. "Many-Objective Multi-Scenario Algorithm for Optimal Reservoir Operation Under Future Uncertainties," Water Resources Management: An International Journal, Published for the European Water Resources Association (EWRA), Springer;European Water Resources Association (EWRA), vol. 32(12), pages 3887-3902, September.
    23. Matthew Harrison-Trainor, 2020. "An Analysis of Random Elections with Large Numbers of Voters," Papers 2009.02979, arXiv.org.
    24. Malthe Munkøe, 2014. "Cycles and instability in politics. Evidence from the 2009 Danish municipal elections," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 158(3), pages 383-397, March.
    25. Daniel Bochsler, 2010. "The Marquis de Condorcet goes to Bern," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 144(1), pages 119-131, July.

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