The Condorcet paradox: an experimental approach to a voting process
This paper analyses the effects played by rules within a coordination game. The starting point is constituted by the wide field of Public Choice theories. More precisely the focus of the research is on the stability of the voting process. The experiment is build on a game played through computers and the experimental subjects must perform some choices that can led to different individual and collective solutions. The game that they play is based on a set of rules that must be voted by the players themselves before a new session of the experiment will be run. The idea is to verify the degree of stability of the collective choices (logrolling phenomena)
|Date of creation:||2003|
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- Peter Kurrild-Klitgaard, 2001.
"An Empirical Example of the Condorcet Paradox of Voting in a Large Electorate,"
Springer, vol. 107(1), pages 135-145, April.
- Kurrild-Klitgaard, Peter, 2001. "An Empirical Example of the Condorcet Paradox of Voting in a Large Electorate," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 107(1-2), pages 135-45, April.
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