The Marquis de Condorcet goes to Bern
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- Adrian Van Deemen, 1999. "The probability of the paradox of voting for weak preference orderings," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 16(2), pages 171-182.
- Peter Kurrild-Klitgaard, 2001.
"An Empirical Example of the Condorcet Paradox of Voting in a Large Electorate,"
Springer, vol. 107(1), pages 135-145, April.
- Kurrild-Klitgaard, Peter, 2001. " An Empirical Example of the Condorcet Paradox of Voting in a Large Electorate," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 107(1-2), pages 135-45, April.
- repec:cup:cbooks:9780521808163 is not listed on IDEAS
- Hannu Nurmi, 1998. "Voting paradoxes and referenda," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 15(3), pages 333-350.
- Brams, Steven J. & Kilgour, D. Marc & Zwicker, William, 1997. "Voting on Referenda: The Separability Problem and Possible Solutions," Working Papers 97-15, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University.
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