Demystifying the ‘metric approach to social compromise with the unanimity criterion’
In a recent book and earlier studies, Donald Saari well clarifies the source of three classical impossibility theorems in social choice and proposes possible escape out of these negative results. The objective of this note is to illustrate the relevance of these explanations in justifying the metric approach to the social compromise with the unanimity criterion.
(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)
If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.
Volume (Year): 35 (2010)
Issue (Month): 1 (June)
|Contact details of provider:|| Web page: http://www.springer.com|
|Order Information:||Web: http://www.springer.com/economics/economic+theory/journal/355|
References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Nitzan,Shmuel, 2009.
"Collective Preference and Choice,"
Cambridge University Press, number 9780521722131.
- Nitzan,Shmuel, 2009. "Collective Preference and Choice," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521897259.
- Donald Saari & Anne Petron, 2006. "Negative externalities and Sen’s liberalism theorem," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 28(2), pages 265-281, 06.
- Graciela Chichilnisky, 1982. "Social Aggregation Rules and Continuity," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 97(2), pages 337-352.
- Saari,Donald G., 2008. "Disposing Dictators, Demystifying Voting Paradoxes," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521731607.
- Lerer, Ehud & Nitzan, Shmuel, 1985. "Some general results on the metric rationalization for social decision rules," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 37(1), pages 191-201, October.
- Shmuel Nitzan, 1989. "More on the Preservation of Preference Proximity and Anonymous Social Choice," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 104(1), pages 187-190.
- Farkas, Daniel & Nitzan, Shmuel, 1979. "The Borda Rule and Pareto Stability: A Comment," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 47(5), pages 1305-1306, September.
- Saari,Donald G., 2008. "Disposing Dictators, Demystifying Voting Paradoxes," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521516051. Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:35:y:2010:i:1:p:25-28. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Sonal Shukla)or (Rebekah McClure)
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.
If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.