Level r Consensus and Stable Social Choice
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References listed on IDEAS
- Farkas, Daniel & Nitzan, Shmuel, 1979. "The Borda Rule and Pareto Stability: A Comment," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 47(5), pages 1305-1306, September.
- Eyal Baharad & Shmuel Nitzan, 2006. "On the selection of the same winner by all scoring rules," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 26(3), pages 597-601, June.
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"Consensus theories: An oriented survey,"
Documents de travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne
10057, Université Panthéon-Sorbonne (Paris 1), Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne.
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More about this item
Keywordssocial choice; unanimity; consensus; preference aggregation rules; transitivity; simple majority; scoring rules; invariance to rule selection;
- D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
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