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Consensus theories : An oriented survey

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Abstract

This article surveys seven directions of consensus theories: Arrowian results, federation consensus rules, metric consensus rules, tournament solutions, restricted domains, abstract consensus theories, algorithmic and complexity issues. This survey is oriented in the sense that it is mainly – but not exclusively – concentrated on the most significant results obtained, sometimes with other searchers, by a team of French searchers who are or were full or associate members of the Centre d'Analyse et de Mathématique Sociale (CAMS)

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  • Olivier Hudry & Bernard Monjardet, 2010. "Consensus theories : An oriented survey," Documents de travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne 10057, Université Panthéon-Sorbonne (Paris 1), Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne.
  • Handle: RePEc:mse:cesdoc:10057
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    Cited by:

    1. Muhammad Mahajne & Shmuel Nitzan & Oscar Volij, 2013. "LEVEL r CONSENSUS AND STABLE SOCIAL CHOICE," Working Papers 1305, Ben-Gurion University of the Negev, Department of Economics.
    2. Edith Elkind & Piotr Faliszewski & Arkadii Slinko, 2015. "Distance rationalization of voting rules," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 45(2), pages 345-377, September.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Consensus theories; Arrowian results; aggregation rules; metric consensus rules; median; tournament solutions; restricted domains; lower valuations; median semilattice; complexity;

    JEL classification:

    • D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
    • C0 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - General

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