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Strategy-proof partitioning

  • Mishra, Debasis
  • Roy, Souvik

We consider the problem of choosing a partition of a set of objects by a set of agents. The private information of each agent is a strict ordering over the set of partitions of the objects. A social choice function chooses a partition given the reported preferences of the agents. We impose a natural restriction on the allowable set of strict orderings over the set of partitions, which we call an intermediate domain. Our main result is a complete characterization of strategy-proof and tops-only social choice functions in the intermediate domain. We also show that a social choice function is strategy-proof and unanimous if and only if it is a meet social choice function.

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Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Games and Economic Behavior.

Volume (Year): 76 (2012)
Issue (Month): 1 ()
Pages: 285-300

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Handle: RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:76:y:2012:i:1:p:285-300
Contact details of provider: Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/622836

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