IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/
MyIDEAS: Login to save this paper or follow this series

Tops-Only Domains

  • Shurojit Chatterji

    ()

    (School of Economics, Singapore Management University)

  • Arunava Sen

    ()

    (Indian Statistical Institute)

In this paper we consider the standard voting model with a finite set of alternatives A and n voters and address the following question: what are the characteristics of domains D that induce the property that every strategy-proof social choice function f : Dn ! A satisfying unanimity, has the tops-only property? We first impose a minimal richness condition which ensures that for every alternative a, there exists an admissible ordering where a is maximal. We identify conditions on D that are sufficient for strategy-proofness and unanimity to imply tops onlyness in the general case of n voters and in the special case, n = 2. We provide an algorithm for constructing tops-only domains from connected graphs with elements of A as nodes. We provide several applications of our results. Finally, we relax the minimal richness assumption and partially extend our results.

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL: https://mercury.smu.edu.sg/rsrchpubupload/14580/topsfeb09(2).pdf
Download Restriction: no

Paper provided by Singapore Management University, School of Economics in its series Working Papers with number 06-2009.

as
in new window

Length: 32 pages
Date of creation: Feb 2009
Date of revision:
Publication status: Published in SMU Economics and Statistics Working Paper Series
Handle: RePEc:siu:wpaper:06-2009
Contact details of provider: Postal: 90 Stamford Road, Singapore 178903
Phone: 65-6828 0832
Fax: 65-6828 0833
Web page: http://www.economics.smu.edu.sg/

More information through EDIRC

Order Information: Email:


References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

as in new window
  1. ASWAL, Navin & CHATTERJI, Shurojit & SEN, Arunava, 1999. "Dictatorial domains," CORE Discussion Papers 1999040, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  2. Barbera, Salvador & Masso, Jordi & Neme, Alejandro, 2005. "Voting by committees under constraints," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 122(2), pages 185-205, June.
  3. H. Moulin, 1980. "On strategy-proofness and single peakedness," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 35(4), pages 437-455, January.
  4. Klaus, Bettina & Peters, Hans & Storcken, Ton, 1997. "Strategy-proof division of a private good when preferences are single-dipped," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 55(3), pages 339-346, September.
  5. Lars-Gunnar Svensson & Pär Torstensson, 2008. "Strategy-proof allocation of multiple public goods," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 30(2), pages 181-196, February.
  6. Barbera, Salvador & Dutta, Bhaskar & Sen, Arunava, 2001. "Strategy-proof Social Choice Correspondences," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 101(2), pages 374-394, December.
  7. Barbera, Salvador & Masso, Jordi & Neme, Alejandro, 1997. "Voting under Constraints," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 76(2), pages 298-321, October.
  8. Benoit, Jean-Pierre, 2002. "Strategic Manipulation in Voting Games When Lotteries and Ties Are Permitted," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 102(2), pages 421-436, February.
  9. Selçuk Özyurt & M. Sanver, 2008. "Strategy-proof resolute social choice correspondences," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 30(1), pages 89-101, January.
  10. Nicolas Gravel & Thierry Marchant & Arunava Sen, 2007. "Ranking Completely Uncertain Decisions by the Uniform Expected Utility Criterion," IDEP Working Papers 0705, Institut d'economie publique (IDEP), Marseille, France, revised 12 Jul 2007.
  11. Gibbard, Allan, 1973. "Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 41(4), pages 587-601, July.
  12. Nehring, Klaus & Puppe, Clemens, 2007. "The structure of strategy-proof social choice -- Part I: General characterization and possibility results on median spaces," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 135(1), pages 269-305, July.
  13. Barbera, S. & Peleg, B., 1988. "Strategy-Proof Voting Schemes With Continuous Preferences," UFAE and IAE Working Papers 91.88, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC).
  14. Barbera Salvador & Gul Faruk & Stacchetti Ennio, 1993. "Generalized Median Voter Schemes and Committees," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 61(2), pages 262-289, December.
  15. Özyurt, Selçuk & Sanver, M. Remzi, 2009. "A general impossibility result on strategy-proof social choice hyperfunctions," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 66(2), pages 880-892, July.
  16. John Duggan & Thomas Schwartz, 2000. "Strategic manipulability without resoluteness or shared beliefs: Gibbard-Satterthwaite generalized," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 17(1), pages 85-93.
  17. Kelly, Jerry S., 1989. "A new informational base for social choice," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 17(2), pages 177-188, April.
  18. Lin Zhou & Stephen Ching, 2002. "Multi-valued strategy-proof social choice rules," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 19(3), pages 569-580.
  19. Demange, Gabrielle, 1982. "Single-peaked orders on a tree," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 3(4), pages 389-396, December.
  20. Nehring, Klaus & Puppe, Clemens, 2007. "Efficient and strategy-proof voting rules: A characterization," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 59(1), pages 132-153, April.
  21. John A. Weymark, 2008. "Strategy-Proofness and the Tops-Only Property," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 10(1), pages 7-26, 02.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:siu:wpaper:06-2009. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (QL THor)

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis using RePEc data.