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Optimal Voting Rules

Author

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  • Alex Gershkov
  • Benny Moldovanu
  • Xianwen Shi

Abstract

We study dominant strategy incentive compatible (DIC) and deterministic mechanisms in a social choice setting with several alternatives. The agents are privately informed about their preferences, and have single-crossing utility functions. Monetary transfers are not feasible. We use an equivalence between deterministic, DIC mechanisms and generalized median voter schemes to construct the constrained-efficient, optimal mechanism for an utilitarian planner. Optimal schemes for other welfare criteria such as, say, a Rawlsian maximin can be analogously obtained.

Suggested Citation

  • Alex Gershkov & Benny Moldovanu & Xianwen Shi, 2013. "Optimal Voting Rules," Working Papers tecipa-493, University of Toronto, Department of Economics.
  • Handle: RePEc:tor:tecipa:tecipa-493
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Mechanism Design; Voting; Dominant Strategy; Utilitarian;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations

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